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ABSTRACT 
 As China’s economy becomes larger—naturally, the global outflow of China’s foreign 
direct investment (FDI) has also been increasing at a rapid pace. One of the most popular regions 
for Chinese investment today is North America. Yet despite China’s great enthusiasm to invest 
in Canada and the US, Chinese firms have received much antagonism in North America. Often 
times, Chinese acquisitions are viewed in a negative light, and are even denied on grounds which 
appear to be erroneous. This study asks an important question: what are the political reasons and 
conditions behind the acceptance and rejection of recent Chinese FDI in North America? To 
answer this question, this study analyzed and compared Canada and the US in great detail. By 
observing the sectorial distribution of Chinese FDI, the institutional constructs, as well as the 
most controversial cases of Chinese takeovers in both countries, the study has found that 
hegemonic competition and institutional structure plays a major role in the evaluation of Chinese 
FDI. Hegemonic competition creates the perception that Chinese FDI is a threat in the US, while 
the institutional structure in US allows the negative perceptions of China to influence the FDI 
evaluation process. Derived from the two major factors, secondary factors such as the policy 
preference of lawmakers, as well as the type of FDI itself are also important determinants of 
Chinese FDI in North America. As a result, Chinese FDI is more likely to be denied in America. 
While in Canada, due to the absence of a Sino-Canadian rivalry, Chinese FDI is perceived with 
more normalcy. Hence, Chinese FDI is less likely to be denied in Canada.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Question 
In recent years, Chinese FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) outflow has increased at a rapid 
pace, especially from 2005 onwards. Despite the potential economic benefits that FDI would 
bring to all parties, a looming uncertainty remains. While adhering to open economic principles, 
Canada and the US are selective towards Chinese FDI. For example, Chinese SOES (State-
Owned Enterprises), Huawei and CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation), which 
had attempted to acquire American firms in the communication and resource sectors respectively, 
were evidently rejected by Congress on grounds of national security. As Chinese FDI begins to 
play a larger role in the global economy, North American economies now must either choose to 
capitalize on the inflow of Chinese FDI or reject it in appeal to national security concerns. In 
response to the heightened awareness of Chinese FDI and its growing global importance, this 
paper poses a unique question: 
What are the political reasons and conditions behind the acceptance and rejection of 
recent Chinese FDI in North America? 
There are several available works on the subject of Chinese FDI, and its inflow to Canada, 
and the US. Organizations such as the Conference Board of Canada, and the US-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission (USCSRC), to name a few have released reports 
analyzing the nature of Chinese FDI, and its potential benefits and threats. Despite the 
commonness of the topic, the research question will facilitate the exploration of the political 
factors involved in the acceptance and/or rejection of Chinese FDI—a nuance perspective in 
today’s literature.  
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1.2 Theoretical Framework 
There are numerous IR theories which seek to explain the China-US relationship in 
general. However, there is no single theory present which can explain in an all-encompassing 
manner why Chinese FDI is rejected. As such, this research took an inductive approach. By 
exploring several established theoretical frameworks from the realist, constructivist, and pluralist, 
schools of thought, a composite-framework was devised in this paper to explain the acceptance 
and rejection of Chinese FDI. The paper establishes that as China’s relative power increases, 
there is potential for Sino-American competition (2010).   
Genuine threats from China often cause Chinese FDI to be perceived as a threat, even 
though in many cases there were no threats associated with the Chinese FDI. In essence, China’s 
growing relative power, based on its economic and militaristic rise, alters the perception of its 
FDI. Since the US, the world’s only hegemonic power is challenged by China; the US would be 
more likely to perceive Chinese FDI as a threat. While in Canada, since Canadians do not 
directly compete with the Chinese for hegemonic supremacy, Chinese FDI is perceived to be less 
of a threat.  
To explain the evaluation process of FDI in the two countries, a pluralist decision model 
was used. Decision makers in both countries were assumed to accept and reject Chinese FDI 
based on group and individual perceptions/interests on Chinese FDI. Following the assumption 
that FDI is more likely to be perceived as a threat in the US, decision makers in the US would 
therefore be more likely to reject Chinese FDI than in Canada.  Therefore, the independent 
variable of this study is the perception of Chinese FDI, and the dependent variable is the 
acceptance or rejection of Chinese FDI. A negative perception is formed by the presence of 
hegemonic competition between China and the host country. While in countries not engaged in 
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competition with China, the perception of Chinese FDI is more positive. With this logic in mind, 
countries not engaged in competition with China (e.g. Canada) are more likely to accept Chinese 
FDI than countries engaged in such completion with China (e.g. US). Second, due to the 
institutional construct of America’s FDI evaluation process, negative perceptions and opinions 
regarding China are more easily able to influence the evaluation of Chinese FDI in the US than 
in Canada. 
Due to the complicated nature of Sino-American relations, there are several more minor 
factors which—under the backdrop of Sino-American competition and institutional constraints— 
also negatively influence the evaluation of Chinese FDI. First, facing a growing China, policy 
makers may have an inherent distrust of Chinese intentions. Such intentions are based on the 
policy preferences and ideological orientations of the lawmakers. And second of all, if the FDI is 
in a strategic sector, chances of its rejection are higher in the US than in Canada.  
 
1.3 Case Selection 
 
To examine the inflow of Chinese FDI in North America, the US and Canada are chosen. 
The selection of these two countries is quite self-explanatory. Geographically, they compose the 
majority of the North American Continent, and are very similar—in that they are both are mixed-
economies adhering more or less to free-market principles and are both federal systems. Mexico 
is not chosen because it is culturally and economically different. To illustrate, both Canada and 
US are undoubtedly Anglo-Saxon countries, while Mexico is generally not considered a member 
of this culture. Canada and the US are both advanced Developed Countries (DC) while Mexico is 
a less developed country (LDC). 
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 More importantly, Mexico receives far less FDI from China vis-à-vis the US and Canada. 
In fact, the two are amongst the top 10 recipients of Chinese FDI (Naidu-Ghelani, 2012). Canada 
ranked number 8: between 2004 and 2010 it had received $2.9 billion worth of FDI from China 
(Ibid). US ranked number 1: between 2004 and 2012 it had received $3.4 billion FDI (Ibid). For 
time frame, this study will primarily focus from the late 1990s and onwards because Chinese FDI 
outflows first began to increase globally, and in North America in the late 1990s. But more 
specifically, this study will examine Chinese FDI outflows to North America from 2005 onwards, 
as Chinese FDI increased dramatically in and after 2005. In short, this study will attempt to find 
necessary conditions using a most similar cases design.  
Currently, the majority of reports on the topic is completed on an ad hoc basis—on either 
the US or Canada—or firm specific studies on major Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
seeking to invest in Canada and US such as Huawei, and CNOOC. For example, the Asian 
Pacific Foundation’s China Goes Global reports describe Chinese FDI inflow in Canada ("China 
goes global," 2010), wwhile reports by the Rhodium group attempts to explain and quantify 
Chinese FDI inflow in the US (Rosen & Hanemann, 2011). The selections of specific 
transactions for examination are based upon some of the most controversial cases in Canada and 
the US in the last 10 years. Controversial cases are selected because they can best highlight the 
details of the review process in the two countries. Furthermore, consideration in selection is 
given to sectors in Canada and the US with the largest amounts of Chinese FDI. This information 
is derived from the data shown in chapter 2.  
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1.4 Methodology 
Since FDI is a quantifiable subject, and that political conditions for rejection are often 
times unquantifiable, a combination of qualitative and quantitative approach is taken in this study.  
There are a number of different sources used in this project. Journal articles, books, and 
analytical reports from scholars and researchers in the field will primarily provide the theoretical 
and conceptual frameworks used to guide the research. Articles and reports are readily found 
online in databases such as Jstor, and that of various think-tanks such as the Asia Pacific 
Foundation, Heritage Foundation, Conference Board of Canada, Peterson Institute, and Rhodium 
Group. The collection of statistics and data regarding Chinese FDI are to be found on 
government databases and websites such as Statistics Canada, the US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, The US and China Economic and Security Review Commission. Lastly, case specific 
evidence and data of Chinese FDI are found in news articles from Medias such as Bloomberg, 
The Wall Street Journal, The Economist, The Financial Times, The Economic Times, Tapei 
Times and Caixin.  
 In order to assess whether national security problems truly exists, Theodore Moran’s 
“Three Threats Framework” was used (2011). Designating supply as the most critical factor in 
determining whether certain FDIs pose a threat, in each of the cases chosen, the effect of each 
particular FDIs’ potential to influence supply was examined.  Furthermore, in order to determine 
if a pluralist decision model, group interests apply in the evaluation of Chinese FDI, efforts were 
made to present the motivations and contentions of law makers capable of affecting the decision 
of Chinese FDI acceptance or rejection.   
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1.5 Key Findings 
 
 This research has several key findings. First, Chinese FDIs are usually not as threatening 
as North American governments deemed them to be. In all the deals examined in chapter 5, the 
capacity for Chinese firms to manipulate the supply of their products in attempt to hurt the host 
country’s economy is too insignificant. In other words, Chinese firms will not be able to 
significantly alter the distribution and/or the price of the products.  Second, a misunderstanding 
of Chinese FDI exists in both countries. Both host countries were unable at times to see the 
benefits of Chinese FDI, and instead chose to deem unthreatening Chinese investments as threats. 
Third of all, in all of the cases examined, group contention and group interests play a role in 
determining the host country’s tendencies towards treating Chinese FDI; either influencing direct 
blocks and/or the creation of legislative measures to make future FDI more difficult. Due to 
institutional constraints on the choices of policymakers in Canada, group interests are shown to 
be more influential in the US than in Canada.  Lastly, in the US, when Chinese takeovers were 
politicized the chances of their rejection are much higher, while in Canada chances of their 
rejection are comparatively lower. This outcome suggests that institutional differences between 
the two North American countries may trigger different outcomes in the evaluation of Chinese 
FDI. 
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CHAPTER 2: INITIAL DATA AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter will accomplish several goals. First, to give the reader a basic understanding 
of the historical context of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and also more importantly, 
to give a basic understanding of Chinese FDI outflows to North America. Second, to display 
recent data on Chinese FDI in North America compiled from the databases of several think tanks, 
and government agencies. Third, to give a prim-facie analysis of the displayed data, this will be 
used in proceeding chapters as evidential support. In essence, this chapter will show whether FDI 
inflow has largely remained in the same sectors throughout time, or have a different pattern in 
sectorial distribution.  
Doing so will enhance the preceding chapters’ capability to give explanations on Chinese 
FDI inflow and their assessment on whether a certain theory or number of theories underpins the 
inflow of Chinese FDI in North America. As such, the first part of the chapter will be a brief 
overview of global and historical data on Chinese FDI. Part two will be a sectorial analysis of 
Chinese FDI in Canada. And part three will be a sectorial analysis of Chinese FDI in the US. 
Throughout the three parts, the chapter will make comparisons and highlight the key differences 
or similarities of Chinese FDI in the context of the globe, Canada, and the US.  
 
2.1 Introduction and Background 
 
 A few decades ago, China was primarily a recipient of foreign direct investment which 
originated from more advanced developed countries (DCs). In the period between 1985-2005, 
Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan have accounted for at least 60% of the total FDI inflow in 
China, whereas, the US, Canada, Japan, and the European Union comprised 25% of the 
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cumulative FDI inflow (Naughton, 2007: 414). Despite the large concentration of regional FDI 
inflow, the US remained the third largest investor in China through 2002 (Ibid: 414). Soon after 
the turn of the century—China, despite its relatively low per capita income, has seen an  increase 
in  its FDI outflows along with other high-growth and medium growth developing countries such 
as India (Prasad, Rajan & Subramanian, 2007).  
Before 1982, no data on any type of Chinese FDI was found in the World Bank Database. 
The lack of such data may be understandable as China’s market liberalization reforms (Gaige 
Kaifang-改革开放) only had begun in late 1978. As one observes the inflow of Chinese FDI 
from the beginning of in 1982, one will see a gradual increase which reaches a peak in 1988, 
drops slightly in 1989, and then proceeds to remain unchanged until 1991-1992. Likewise, when 
examining the level of FDI outflows, a less noticeable but, similar pattern is observed.  What 
then may explain this pattern? 
After the June 4
th
 Tiananmen Crisis (Liusi Shijian-六四事件) which took place in 1989, 
members of the pro-reform faction within the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) central 
leadership quickly fell out of power. Replacing Zhao Ziyang, a member of the pro-reform faction 
as premier, Li Peng, a member of the conservative faction wished to “…recommit the Chinese 
government to socialism; that is, to the preeminence of public ownership and central planning” 
(Coase & Wang, 2012:105). The change in CCP central leadership after Liusi, coupled with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and  the numerous bankruptcies of Communist states in the early 
1990s diminished the sentiments for reform within the politburo during this period (Ibid: 107). 
As such FDI flows between 1989 and 1991 declined and were relatively stagnate. The time was 
not ripe until 1992 in which the then retired “Paramount Leader” Deng Xiaoping initiated his 
 9 
 
Southern Tour (Nanxun-南巡) in order to reinvigorate the market reforms which were “caged” 
by the conservatives. By fiercely arguing against his opponents as he visits the Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) on the Nanxun, and by threatening his opponents using his control over the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as leverage, Deng was soon successful in implementing his 
desired pro-growth policies (Fewsmith, 2008: 62-71). As such, Deng’s success in reinvigorating 
the reforms may explain the increase of FDI flows beginning 1992.  
 
(The world bank, 2012) 
In figure 1, the percentages of FDI flow in the 2000s appear to be not as high as the 
percentages in the peaks between 1992 and 1993. One should remember that figure 1 is merely a 
percentage of GDP. Figure 2 shows China’s GDP per capita between the years 1982 and 2011 by 
using three different measures for GDP per capita. On all measures, China’s GDP is has been 
inclining steadily since 1982. By combining the data on figure 1 and figure 2, one is able to 
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determine the relationship between FDI and GDP to a more exact degree. The percentage of FDI 
outflow and inflow from each year, beginning in 1982 is multiplied by the GDP per capita of 
each year to determine FDI per capita. Doing so will indicate whether an upward trend exists for 
both inflow and outflow of FDI. The data presented on figure 3 is calculated using this formula 
by using GDP per capital (constant 2000 US$) as the benchmark GDP per capita.  
 
(The world bank, 2012) 
Overall, the trend is positive—the GDP per capita rises with each following year, and 
both the inflow and outflow of FDI rises with along with GDP per capita. The dramatic increase 
in both the inflow and outflow of FDI beginning 2005 can also be observed. According to Dan 
Steinbock (2012: par 4), “Between 2005 and 2010, China’s FDI abroad soared from an annual 
average of below $3 billion to more than $50 billion, bringing its total global FDI stock abroad to 
over $300 billion”.  China’s FDI outflow is one of the fastest growing in the world—in 2011 
reaching a total of $1.7 trillion (“Economist”, 2012). The surge of FDI outflow can be attributed 
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to China’s “Go Out Policy” (Zouchuqu Zhanlue-走出去战略), first proposed by the central 
government in 1999 but most effectively implemented five years later (Ibid). Promoting FDI 
outflow, diversifying production, and gaining new international markets for domestic products 
among other goals which enhance China’s capability for international investments are some of 
the major aims of this policy ("To better implement," 2006). 
 
(The world bank, 2012) 
Where then are the top destinations for Chinese investments? Between 2004 and 2010, of 
the destinations for Chinese FDI: Canada, the US, Australia, South Africa, and Singapore are 
amongst the top 10 (Naidu-Ghelani, 2012). Needless to say, these countries are all high income 
DCs.  Lucas (1990) demonstrates that a fundamental contradiction exists between international 
finance theory and the realities of international capital flow. Since poor or less developed 
countries (LDCs) have a scarcity of capital, marginal returns to capital in poor countries would 
be much higher than in rich DCs. As a result, theoretically, ceteris paribus, capital should move 
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from DCs to LDCS—yet, international investments normally occur between DCs, and not 
between DCs and LDCs (Ibid). This phenomenon is widely known as the Lucas Paradox. As 
interesting as this framework may be when encompassing the Chinese context, exploring it is not 
the purpose of this chapter, nor is doing so within the scope of the thesis.  
 
(Scissors, 2011) 
Although as a region, China’s investments in North America are not as large as those in 
Latin America and the Arab World, as a country, the US ($28.1) is the second largest recipient of 
Chinese FDI after Australia ($34.8). Combining Canada and the US, collectively, the amount of 
investment received in the two countries exceeds that of any single country (Scissors, 2011).   
 Which are the most attractive sectors for Chinese investments? China’s overall global 
sectorial distribution of FDI is very different from that of the rest of the world. LDCs in general 
invest in more services and primary industries (agriculture, mining, and oil) than DCs (“The 
Economist”, 2012). China on the other hand, can be seen as a more extreme version of a LDC 
38.4 
49.8 
47.1 45.7 
43.7 
34.8 34 
31.6 
(Figure 3.1) World Chinese Non-Bond Investments 2010 ($Billions) 
North America (Canada and US) Latin America
Arab World West Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa Europe
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with an even larger percentage of FDI going to the services and the primary sectors—in fact only 
5% of Chinese investments are in manufacturing (Ibid). In the years from 2004 to 2011, China's 
FDI grew from $5.5 billion to over $65 billion a year—by 2015 it is expect to grow to over $150 
billion (Ibid).  
 
(“The Economist”, 2012) 
 
2.2 Sectorial Distribution of Chinese FDI in Canada 
 
 Unlike what many would expect, China does not have a significant amount of FDI in 
Canada.  A simple comparison of China’s FDI with that of countries with much greater levels of 
FDI in Canada is enough to exemplify this point. The following figures were created using data 
collected from Statistics Canada by selecting a range of countries based on their respective level 
of FDI in Canada in order to better display the comparison.  
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
China
Developing Countries
Developed Countries
World
(Figure 4) Outward Chinese FDI By Sector, 2006-2008,  as % of Total  
Services
Manufacturing
Primary
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(Figure 5) FDI Inflow in Canada between 2005-2011 (Millions of Dollars) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
United 
States 
251,477 265,096 288,257 292,364 299,340 318,412 326,055 
United 
Kingdom 
29,499 39,409 56,838 49,551 46,933 36,213 38,943 
France 28,293 17,181 17,154 16,655 17,565 17,315 15,319 
Japan 10,523 13,439 13,572 12,411 14,518 12,567 12,789 
Brazil 3,069 12,868 13,974 14,492 13,177 17,261 18,626 
China 928 X 4,224 5,665 12,220 11,701 10,905 
India 171 211 1,988 6,514 6,217 4,364 4,396 
All 
Countries 
397,828 437,171 512,266 550,539 572,842 585,107 607,497 
X=Confidential Data withheld by Statistics Canada  
(Statistics Canada, Table 376-0051) 
 
 
(Statistics Canada, Table 376-0051) 
FDI inflow into Canada has been growing since 2005, with the US having the most FDI 
in Canada out of all countries. In 2005, the US has an FDI level of $251,477, and in 2011, it has 
0
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(Figure 6) FDI Inflow in Canada between 2006-2011 (Millions of 
Dollars) 
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an FDI level of $326,055 (53.7% share of total FDI inflow). As best displayed on figure 6, FDI 
levels of other DCs in Canada do not come close to that of the US; China’s FDI in Canada is 
even more insignificant. Using the formula for finding percent change (Percent change = [(Value 
for 2011 – Value for 2005)/Value for 2005] * 100), it can be determined that American FDI level 
from 2005 to 2011 has grown by approximately 30%. Interestingly, all three LDCs have 
witnessed a dramatic incline in outward FDI levels between 2005 and 2007; Brazil jumping from 
$3,069 to $13,974, India from $171 to $1,988, and China from $928 to $4,224. Using the same 
formula, for China between 2005 and 2011, it can be determined that Chinese FDI levels grew 
by approximately 1075%, reaching $10,905 in 2011 (1.8% share of total FDI inflow).  
 Dividing the percentage growth of American and Chinese FDI by number of years 
between 2005 and 2011 inclusive (Annual rate of change= percentage change/N), one can 
determine and compare their respective annual rates of growth during this period. The US has an 
annual FDI growth rate of 4.28% (30%/7yrs), while China has an annual outward FDI growth 
rate of 153% (1075%/7yrs). Thus, although it appears that the US has more FDI in Canada 
overall, annual Chinese FDI growth rate is much higher than that of the US. The data on Chinese 
FDI in Canada from the two charts are quite unsurprising. The global measurement of Chinese 
FDI during this period described in the previous section indicated that Chinese FDI was indeed 
on the rise globally as well. Therefore, the data on the amount of Chinese FDI in Canada can be 
correlated with the global trend of Chinese FDI in this period. “Given the fundamentals that are 
driving China’s FDI, it seems reasonable to conclude that China will be the third-largest FDI 
investor in Canada before 2015, and could easily place second to the US by 2020” (Grant, 2012: 
12). 
 16 
 
To further understand the Chinese FDI in Canada, one must study in detail the 
distribution of Chinese FDI in the major sectors. To begin with, one would find understanding 
the broader levels of FDI distribution in Canada useful as such knowledge would allow one to 
make comparisons between China’s FDI distribution and that of the world. Figure 7 provides an 
excellent picture of the world’s FDI sectorial distribution in Canada between 2006 and 2011. 
According to the figure, world FDI inflow has been growing each year in Canada but most 
prominently in the energy and metallic minerals industry, and the finance and insurance industry.   
(Figure 7) Foreign Direct Investment Inflow in Canada from the World 2006 - 2011 
(Millions of dollars) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
All industries 437,171 512,266 550,539 572,842 585,107 607,497 
Wood and paper industry 15,371 15,387 9,775 13,395 9,361 9,727 
Energy and metallic minerals 
industry 
120,513 168,562 196,147 190,747 200,724 209,239 
Energy 82,214 107,889 131,033 131,347 143,043 148,309 
Metallic minerals and metal 
products 
38,299 60,672 65,114 59,400 57,681 60,930 
Machinery and transportation 
equipment industry 
51,164 54,620 50,902 49,853 51,239 55,609 
Machinery and equipment (except 
electronics) 
19,104 20,129 18,599 18,644 18,927 19,521 
Transportation equipment 32,060 34,491 32,304 31,209 32,312 36,088 
Finance and insurance industry 89,708 102,306 119,281 134,897 150,138 149,360 
Services and retailing industry 41,925 48,508 49,417 50,188 53,879 55,053 
All other industries 118,490 122,883 125,017 133,761 119,765 128,510 
Food, beverage and tobacco 28,731 29,079 32,125 33,222 30,498 33,795 
Chemicals, chemical products and 
textiles 
41,462 45,224 40,651 46,391 37,062 41,018 
Electrical and electronic products 28,454 27,543 28,152 30,938 31,824 32,256 
Construction and related activities 13,265 13,082 15,870 16,950 14,839 15,297 
Communications 6,578 7,955 8,219 6,260 5,542 6,144 
(Statistics Canada - Table 376-0038) 
The energy and metallic minerals industry in 2006 received $120,513 in FDI, and in 2011, 
it received a total of $209,239. The percentage of growth between 2006 and 2011 is 
approximately 73%, with an annual growth rate of 12%. For the finance and insurance industry, 
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in 2006, the sector received $89,708 in FDI, and in 2011, it received $149,360. The percentage 
of growth is approximately 66%, with an annual growth rate of 11%. Indeed, these numbers 
show that the world as a whole has been heavily investing in the two sectors, and more broadly,  
when taking into account of the data on the figure, one can infer that Canada is an attractive 
destination for global FDI. This conclusion brings about an important question, how large are the 
two sectors, and most importantly, which are the sectors that receive the greatest amount of 
global FDI?   
 
(Statistics Canada –Table 376-0038) 
Figure 8 was created from the data from Figure 7, using 2011, the most recent year with 
available data to show the size of each sector. Most interestingly, the sectors which experienced 
the greatest amount of growth are also the very same sectors which received the greatest amounts 
of global FDI in comparison to all the major sectors. The energy and metallic minerals industry 
received 34% of the total FDI inflow, while the finance and insurance industry received 25% of 
2% 
34% 
9% 25% 
9% 
21% 
(Figure 8) FDI Inflow In Canada from the World in 2011 
Arranged by Sectors  
Wood and paper industry
Energy and metallic minerals
industry
Machinery and transportation
equipment industry
Finance and insurance industry
Services and retailing industry
All other industries
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the total FDI inflow.  How does Chinese FDI in Canada compare with that of the world? Data on 
the sectorial distribution of Chinese FDI in Canada is difficult to obtain as “Statistics Canada 
maintains confidentiality protocols for data collection from firms that limit publication of any 
China data (before 2008) and sector distribution (post-2008)” (Grant, 2012: 12). According to 
Grant, in his discussions with Statistics Canada, he had found that approximately half of the 
current Chinese investments are in the resource sector (Ibid: 12).  
 In order to overcome the problem of Statistic Canada’s confidentiality protocols, data 
must be collected and compiled independently. Figure 9 is created by tallying the data from the 
monthly reports of The Asian Pacific Foundation’s (APF) Investment Monitor beginning from 
January 2008, the foundation’s first available report. It is important to note that only select 
investments are recorded in the foundation’s reports as they are based on the daily-listings of 
transactions from the foundation’s Canada-Asia News Service. As such only publically reported 
investments from Asian and Canadian companies are included in the reports. These conditions 
limit the scope of the report to only large and notable deals. Although usually, it is more accurate 
and methodologically sound to show data in USD amounts, the lack of sufficient information on 
the value of the deals for some of the recorded deals makes displaying and comparing the data in 
USD difficult.  
The categorization of the sectors in figure 9 is based on Statistics Canada’s categorization 
shown in Figures 7 and 8. However, the categorization will combine the wood and paper 
industry together with all other industries: as the percentage of wood and paper industry is quite 
small, it is not significant enough to be in its own category. Furthermore, the service and 
retailing industry shown in figure 9 encompasses services and retailing related to the 
development or promotion of information/communication technology as all of the recorded 
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Chinese investments in this sector are of this nature.  Machinery and transportation equipment 
sector is removed as there are no recorded Chinese investments in this sector. Lastly, all 
investments compiled only include firms based in mainland China, or subsidiaries of mainland 
Chinese firms. Firms from the Greater China Region (dazhonghuadiqu-大中华地区) are not 
included in the figure unless they are mainland firms or subsidiaries of mainland firms.   
(Figure 9) Sectorial Distribution of Chinese FDI In Canada From 2008-2012 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Energy and metallic minerals 
industry 
4 13 7 7 10 
Finance and Insurance 
Industry 
0 1 0 2 1 
Service and Retailing 
Industry 
(Information/Communication 
Technology 
0 0 2 2 1 
All Other Industries 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 4 14 9 11 13 
(The Asia pacific foundation, 2008-2012)   
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(The Asia Pacific Foundation, 2008-2012)   
Figures 9 and 10, show several trends that might be useful to note. First, it appears that in 
2008, there isn’t a very significant amount of Chinese FDI in Canada (4 firms). While there is 
growth in the number of firms investing in Canada since 2009 (13 firms); the rate of growth 
appears to be insignificant or stagnating: in 2010 (9 firms), 2011 (7 firms), and 2012 (10 firms). 
Second, while Grant (2012: 12) suggests that about 50% of the firms are in the resource sector 
(Energy and metallic minerals industry), the figures indicate that clearly, the overwhelming 
majority of Chinese investments are in the resource sector. A rudimentary comparison of the 
total line and the energy and metallic minerals industry line shown in figure 10 is suffice to show 
how the total line is skewed by the number of firms investing in the energy and metallic minerals 
industry. The pattern of the total line is hence very much defined by the pattern of the resource 
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(Figure 10) Number of Chinese FDIs from 2008-2010 Categorized by 
Sectors 
Total
Energy and metallic minerals industry
Finance and insurance industry
Service and Retailing Industry (Information/Communication Technology)
All other industries
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sector line. In other words, the investments in the resource sector hold the greatest significance 
vis-à-vis the other major sectors.   
The service and retail industry which includes firms in information/communication 
technology received the second largest number of investments. It is interesting to note that in the 
years before 2010 there were no investments in this sector, but from 2010, there are investments 
in this sector each year. Lastly, the finance and insurance industry appears to be more sporadic, 
with only 1 in 2009, 0 in 2010, 2 in 2011, and 1 in 2012. Aside from the resource sector which 
receives annual investments in all 5 years, other sectors are inconsistent, and do not receive 
investments each year.  Moreover, one must note that even within sectors there appears to be no 
significant signs of growth in investments aside from the clear sign of growth from 2008 
onwards.
(The Asia Pacific Foundation, 2008-2012)   
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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2009
2010
2011
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Total of 5 Years
(Figure 11) Sectorial Distribution of Chinese FDI in Canada from 
2008-2012 as % of Annual Total 
Energy and metallic minerals industry
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Service and Retailing Industry (Information/Communication Technology)
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 In figure 11, tallying and dividing the total number of firms in each sector by the total 
number of firms, allows one to find the exact percentage of each sector over the last 5 years. 
Currently about 80% of Chinese FDI in Canada is in the energy and metallic minerals industry, 
8 % is in the finance and insurance industry, 10% is in the service and retailing industry, and 
finally, 2% is in all other industries. A comparison of the percentages of sectorial distribution per 
annum from 2008 and 2012 demonstrates an interesting phenomenon—Chinese investments 
diversified from only being in energy and metallic minerals industry in 2008 to include both the 
finance and insurance industry and the service and retailing industry in 2012. When comparing 
the data for the year 2011 on figure 11 to the percentage distribution in figure 8, several 
observations can be made. Chinese FDI is 43% higher than the world in the energy and metallic 
minerals, 17.32% lower than the rest of the world in the finance and insurance industries, and 
only approximately 1.3% lower than the world in the services and retailing industry.    
To provide more details on the development of figure 9, the following will give a brief 
overview on the notable recent FDI deals recorded in each sector. One can see from the 
following figure that, Dalian Turuss Wood Company is the only company from China that 
invested in the wood and paper industry in Canada, and more interestingly, the only company 
that invested outside of the three major sectors.  
(Figure 12) Notable Recent FDI Deals Recorded in Each Sector 
Sector Year/Month Firms 
Energy and Metallic 
Minerals Industry 
2012/December CNOOC Limited’s acquisition of Nexen 
Inc. of Calgary for C$15.1 billion approved 
2012/August Inter-Citic Minerals Inc. will be acquired by 
Western Mining Group Co. Ltd., for about 
C$250 million 
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Finance and Insurance 
Industry 
2012/June The Agricultural Bank of China opened an 
office in Vancouver, its first in Canada and 
its fifth overseas. 
Service and Retailing 
Industry 
(Information/Communication 
technology) 
2012/September Ice Wireless of Inuvik, and Iristel Inc. 
formed partnership with Huawei Canada to 
provide 3G cellular services to rural and 
remote communities in Northern Canada 
All other industries 2012/September Dalian Turuss Wood Company will open a 
manufacturing facility  to produce solid and 
engineered hardwood flooring 
(The Asia Pacific Foundation, 2008-2012)   
 
2.3 Sectorial Distribution of Chinese FDI in the United States 
 
Does the US have a similar pattern as Canada in regards to its FDI inflows? Using data 
collected from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, figure 13 is created by selecting countries 
that vary widely in their FDI in the US. Generally, between 2005 and 2011, the total amount of 
FDI in the US, taking into account of all countries grew by 55%. The United Kingdom which has 
the largest level of FDI in the US throughout the 7 years has a 17% share of total FDI in 2011, 
with a growth rate per annum of 2.72%. This percentage means that from 2005 to 2011, United 
Kingdom’s FDI in the US grew by a total of 19%. Canada has a medium level of FDI in the US 
vis-à-vis within the group of selected countries. From 2005-2011, Canadian FDI has grown by 
27%, with a growth rate per annum of 3.89%.   
How does China compare with Canada and the United Kingdom? Similar to its FDI 
outflows to Canada, China’s FDI inflows to the US remains very low when compared to most 
countries. However, Chinese FDI’s rate of growth, similar to its rate of growth of in Canada, is 
very high (564% between 2005 and 2011).  Thus, in the 9 years, Chinese FDI grew by about an 
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average of 80% per year, while India grew by 25% and Brazil by 16%. Again, when compared to 
the FDI of other LDCs, China’s is the fastest growing.  
(Figure 13) FDI Inflow in the United States between  2005-2011 (Millions of Dollars) 
Historical Cost Basis 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
United 
Kingdom 
371,350 414,629 405,543 447,529 414,590 387,163 442,179 
Japan 189,851 204,020 222,695 234,748 238,140 252,077 289,490 
Canada 165,667 165,281 201,924 168,746 188,943 188,350 210,864 
France 114,260 147,799 141,487 141,922 158,924 174,698 198,741 
Brazil 2,051 1,054 2,091 16 -1,430 1,378 5,038 
India 1,497 1,438 1,671 2,820 2,555 4,110 4,888 
China 574 785 584 1,105 1,624 3,245 3,815 
All 
Countries 
1,634,121 1,840,463 1,993,156 2,046,662 2,069,438 2,264,385 2,547,828 
(U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2012) 
 
(U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2012) 
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(Figure 14) FDI Inflow in the United States between  2005-2011 
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 What are the most attractive sectors for investment? The following figure is compiled 
using the total assets of majority-owned U.S. affiliates. The original data has been modified in 
order to include the energy sector which was created by combining the data on the sub-industries 
of petroleum and coal products, mining, and utilities. Appropriate calculations were done to 
insure that assets of all industries sum up to the total asset. Hence, as a result, a percentage value 
of each industry can be determined.  
 
(U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2012) 
As shown on figure 15, the finance and insurance sector by far has the greatest 
percentage (69%) of the total, followed by manufacturing which accounts for 11%. The energy 
sector in the US is not very high with only 5% of the total. Compared to figure 8, one can see 
that the percentage of investments in the energy sector in Canada (34%) is almost 7 times that of 
the US’. While the percentage of investments in the finance and insurance industry in the US is 
about 2.8 times that of Canada’s (25%). This preliminary comparison demonstrates an important 
11% 
5% 
69% 
5% 
1% 
2% 
7% 
  (Figure 15) Selected Data of Majority-Owned U.S. Affiliates by 
Industry of Affiliate as % of total, 2010 , based on industry assets 
Manufacturing
Energy (Petroleum and Coal
products), Mining and utilities
Finance and insurance
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Information
Other Industries
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point. While Canada and the US are very similar cases, their respective sectorial distribution of 
FDI have notably different attributes. On a global scale, one can note that aggregate levels 
sectorial distribution of FDI in the US is highly concentrated in one dominant sector, 
encompassing a majority of total investments. While Canada’s sectorial distribution of FDI is 
much more diversified than the US.   
Does a similar pattern one saw in global investment figures hold true for Chinese 
investments? Fortunately, there is an abundance of data on Chinese FDI in the US to evaluate 
this question. The following is a figure created by compiling the data from the Rhodium Group’s 
(RHG) China investment monitor. RHG “gathers information on investment activities using a 
bottom-up approach to overcome some of the difficulties associated with the traditional process 
of collecting FDI data” (Rhodium Group, 2013). News monitoring and evaluation for the 
monitor were accomplished by RHG using news services such as Bloomberg, Nexis, Zoominfo 
and Google (Ibid). In addition, a refinement of raw data is done by setting a “minimum 
investment threshold value of $1 million which excludes small-scale deals such as family 
restaurants or smaller businesses from the database” (Ibid).  Although there is data on the value 
of Chinese investments in USD in each sector, in order to more accurately compare investments 
in Canada and the US, number of firms will be used as the standard of measurement. 
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(Figure 16) Number of Chinese FDI In the United States between 2004 and 2012, 
categorized by Sectors 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 9yrs 
Agriculture & 
Food 2 0 0 1 2 0 2 3 4 14 
Automotive & 
Aviation 5 9 3 11 4 8 10 14 7 71 
Basic 
Materials 1 2 0 7 4 5 4 9 3 35 
Consumer 
Products & 
Services 
5 8 5 6 6 13 9 13 3 68 
Energy 
1 0 0 6 3 14 20 15 10 69 
Entertain. & 
Real Estate 0 0 1 1 2 1 5 7 5 22 
Finance & 
Bus. Services 6 2 2 3 6 6 6 7 6 44 
Health & 
Biotech 2 0 3 1 8 5 7 8 3 37 
Ind. & 
Electronic 
Equip 
6 6 5 12 6 15 14 12 12 88 
Information 
Technology 2 8 8 7 13 10 19 21 6 94 
Transport & 
Construction 2 0 1 5 0 0 8 1 3 20 
Total 
32 35 28 60 54 77 104 110 62 562 
(Rhodium Group, 2012) 
Since the methodology of the RHG and the APF for compiling data is different, it is 
difficult to determine to an exact degree whether there is more Chinese FDI in a certain sector in 
the US than one such sector in Canada. Nonetheless, one can clearly observe that the 
diversification of Chinese FDI sectorial distribution in the US is greater than the diversification 
in Canada, which is concentrated solely into a few major sectors. Although there are some 
sectors which received more Chinese FDI than others, the concentration of Chinese FDI is not as 
drastic as in Canada. This trend is quite different from the comparison of world FDI 
concentration of Canada and the US—as demonstrated previously to be more concentrated in US 
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while more diversified in Canada. Overall, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of 
investments per year since 2008; however, the decline in 2012 brings doubts on whether an 
upward trend exists. Looking at a number of sectors such as the energy, and information 
technology sectors, one also can see on figure 17 that there has been decline in investments since 
2011, while the trend has been positive before 2011.  
 
(Rhodium Group, 2012) 
There are several interesting differences one may note by comparing Chinese FDI 
sectorial distribution in US to that of the world. First one may note from figure 15 that while the 
energy sector is only 5%, figure 15, which is a total of the 9 years show Chinese FDI to be 12%, 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Energy 1 0 0 6 3 14 20 15 10
Ind. & Electronic Equip 6 6 5 12 6 15 14 12 12
Information Technology 2 8 8 7 13 10 19 21 6
Total 32 35 28 60 54 77 104 110 62
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(Figure 17) Number of Chinese Investments in The United States 
between 2004-2012, with Selected Sectors Displayed  
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higher than the world percentage. Furthermore, the finance industry is shown to be 8% on figure 
18, much lower than the world percentage of 69%.  Since the methodology of sectorial 
categorization for the two figures are different, and that figure 15 is only the 2010 data, the 
significance and the accuracy of comparing the two figures may be quite low.  However, one can 
reduce this disparity by only using the 2010 statistics of figure 16 to compare with figure 15. In 
2010, the percentage of Chinese FDI in the energy sector is 19.2%, almost 4 times the world 
percentage for that year, while the percentage in the finance sector is about 5%, which is quite 
comparable to the 9 year aggregate percentage. Thus, it is safe to conclude that Chinese FDI is 
more prevalent in the energy sector but far less prevalent in the finance sector when compared to 
the world percentage.  
 
(Rhodium Group, 2012)  
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(Figure 18) % of Total  Chinese FDI in the United States between 2004-
2012, Categorized by Sectors 
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(Rhodium Group, 2012)  
 
By taking a percentage of only the last 5 years, one can better compare the American and 
Canadian statistics. The energy sector (15%) shown on figure 19 is the second largest in the last 
5 years while in Canada it is (80%), a drastic difference between the two respective levels exist. 
In terms of the finance industry, both countries are quite comparable at around 8%. The US leads 
Canada in investments in information technology and services with a combined percentage of 
28%, while Canada has only 9.8%. Again, it is important to note that the methodology is 
different for the two foundations’ data collection; hence this comparison may not be entirely 
accurate. Nonetheless, due to the lack of data today, this comparison is still significant in 
offering a more clear understanding of the sectorial distribution of Chinese FDI in the two 
respective countries.   
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(Figure 19) % of Total Chinese FDI in the United States between 2008-
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(The Asia Pacific Foundation, 2008-2012) 
 
(The Asia Pacific Foundation, 2008-2012; Rhodium Group, 2012) 
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Categorized by Sectors 
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(Figure 21) Number of Sectors With Chinese FDI 2008-2012 
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Before concluding this section, it is important to once again emphasize and compare the 
differences in the concentration of Chinese FDI in Canada and the US. The above chart shows 
the change in Chinese FDI concentration in the number of sectors in the years examined. Since 
the method of sectorial categorization for the APF and RHG is also different, the above may not 
be the most accurate comparison. From this figure, one can see that both countries have Chinese 
investments in a greater number of sectors over the years. The US began with Chinese 
investments in 10 sectors in 2008, and in 2012 had 12 sectors with Chinese FDI, while Canada 
has 1 sector in 2008, and 3 in 2012. 
  The disparity between Canada and the US in the level of concentration infers an 
interesting question. Does a high level of concentration in certain sectors convey the presence of 
a threat for Chinese FDI or does it convey the lack of such a threat?  Depending on the host 
country, a more suitable method would be to determine the ratio of Chinese firms to Canadian or 
American firms in the sector. The reason is because a higher number of Chinese firms to 
domestic firms within a particular sector would mean a higher level of Chinese control over the 
sector—which consequently would mean a higher level of threat (Moran, 2012: 6). However, an 
even more interesting question remains. Perhaps because the host country has perceived Chinese 
FDI to have so little threat that it has allowed the concentration of Chinese FDI to naturally form. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
There are several key observations made in this chapter. Chinese FDI has been on the rise 
globally. Most of Chinese investments are in the services industries, with a larger portion vis-a-
vis the world in the primary industries. In North America, Chinese FDI has also been growing at 
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a rapid pace but in both countries Chinese FDI makes up only a very small amount of total FDI. 
In Canada, Chinese FDI is concentrated in only a few sectors with most investments in the 
energy sector, while in the US Chinese FDI is more dispersed. The information technology and 
energy sectors are the largest recipients in the last 5 years. Although the US and Canada have 
many similar features, differences in overall sectorial distribution and concentration of FDI 
seems to suggest that there are different evaluation standards between the two countries.  
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CHAPTER 3: REGULATORY PROCESS AND FRAMEWORKS 
This chapter will introduce the process and frameworks for evaluating FDI in Canada and 
the US in attempt to give readers a clear understanding of how FDI is normally evaluated in the 
two countries. Furthermore, the chapter will present a brief analysis on recent regulatory 
developments in both countries. Most importantly, through this rigorous investigation into each 
country’s regulatory frameworks, this chapter seeks to discover if one country’s review process 
is more biased against Chinese investments than the other. Knowing this information will be 
important when examining the evidence and theoretical explanations regarding the inflow of 
Chinese FDI presented in later chapters. This chapter will be divided into two parts. The first part 
of this chapter will cover the process and frameworks of evaluating FDI in Canada. Part two will 
cover the process and frameworks in the US.  
 
3.1 Process and Frameworks in Canada  
3.11 Investment Canada Act  
In Canada, the evaluation of FDI is determined by the Investment Canada Act (ICA), 
established in 1985 under the Mulroney government after the disbandment of the Foreign 
Investment Review Agency. The following is an introductory excerpt from the ICA, explaining 
the Act’s purpose: 
“Recognizing that increased capital and technology benefits Canada, and recognizing the 
importance of protecting national security, the purposes of this Act are to provide for the 
review of significant investments in Canada by non-Canadians in a manner that 
encourages investment, economic growth and employment opportunities in Canada and 
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to provide for the review of investments in Canada by non-Canadians that could be 
injurious to national security” (Investment Canada Act, 2013: 6). 
 Under the ICA, in most cases FDI over a minimum threshold are automatically reviewed 
by members of the federal government to assess whether the investment will procure a net 
benefit to Canada (Ibid, 19).  The threshold for non-World Trade Organization (WTO) members 
as of 2013 is 5 million while WTO members such as China has a threshold 344 million 
("Thresholds for review," 2013). This number indicates that only very large investments from 
China will ever be evaluated and politicized. Furthermore, one should note that although on 
paper the Act appears to have a very clear set of objectives–many experts deem it to be both 
convoluted and outdated. These criticisms were most notably expressed in Steven Globerman’s 
evaluation report of the ICA commissioned by the Federal Government In his evaluation, 
Globerman pointed out that, although individual criteria are set to test whether the FDI in 
question will be a net benefit to Canada, there are no weights for each individual criterion to 
indicate their relative importance (2008: 18-20). Among other criticisms, he notes issues with the 
ICA’s transparency as well as the historic consistency of evaluating FDI (Ibid).  
 The actual process of review FDI is divided into three separate scenarios, depending on 
the nature and plans of the FDI. The following figure will give a brief overview of how the 
review process will differ in each of the scenarios. It is important to recognize that not all 
investments require a minimum threshold for review. The Minister of Finance, as widely 
believed to the primary decision maker in most cases, has less power to influence the review 
process in select cases when cultural and national security concerns are tied to the FDI under 
review.   
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(Figure 22) Three Scenarios for Reviewing FDI Under The Investment Canada Act 
Scenario 
Conditions 
A:WTO member with 
Investments over 
$344million, and non-
member with direct 
investments over 
$5million, and indirect 
investments over 
$50million 
B:The FDI is to acquire a 
cultural business with over 
$5million assets, or if the 
Government of Canada 
considers the acquisition 
of the cultural business 
should be reviewed under 
public interest  
C:The Government of 
Canada deems the FDI to 
be a threat to national 
security 
Authority 
in the 
Review 
Process 
A:The authority is held 
by the Minister of 
Industry to decide if the 
investment will yield a 
“net benefit” for Canada 
B:The Minister of 
Canadian Heritage will 
decide whether the 
investment will yield a 
“net benefit” for Canada 
according to the 
investment’s with the 
strategic objectives of the 
Department of Canadian 
Heritage 
C: National Security is 
not defined in the ICA.  
A review is triggered by 
the Governor in Council 
on the Minster of 
Industry’s 
recommendation, after 
consulting with the 
Minister of Public Safety 
to determine if the 
investment will be a 
threat to national security 
(Firgon, 2011:2-4) 
  There are only three instances so far when the ICA was used to block investments. First, 
in May 2008, the Conservative government used the ICA to block the takeover of MacDonald, 
Dettwiler and Associates Ltd., an aerospace company (Collins, 2011: 153). In November 2010, 
the acquisition of Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc. by the Australian mining company 
BHP Billiton Ltd was blocked (Ibid: 153). And most recently, in October 2010, the Petronas 
takeover of Progress Energy Resources was also blocked (Rocha & Grudgings, 2012). 
 
3.12 Bill C-60 
 
On April 29th, under the backdrop of the CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation)-Nexen deal as well as the Petronas-Progress Energy deal, Finance Minister, Jim 
Flaherty introduced the Economic Action Plan 2013 Act (Bill C-60) (Woods, 2013). If passed, 
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Bill C-60 would amend the ICA in a number of ways. This event was unsurprising as since 2007 
onwards, in response to the perpetual increase of global SOE investments, the Federal 
Government has already been discussing and “outlining key considerations” for which the 
Minister of Industry should account for when reviewing investments from  foreign SOEs 
("Statement regarding investment," 2012).  
There are several key changes which Bill C-60 would implement if passed. The Minister 
of Industry would have the power to define whether an otherwise Canadian-controlled entity is 
being controlled by an SOE or not, and whether the entity in question is indeed an SOE or not 
(Lally, Glossop, Franklyn & Anderson, 2013:3-4). Although Bill-C 60 was intended to make the 
ICA clearer, by granting the Minster power to define what constitutes an SOE, the Minister will 
essentially make such judgments anchored on a set of immeasurable values (Hasselback, 2013). 
But more interestingly, Bill-C 60 will raise the minimum threshold for the review of FDI starting 
at $600million to $1billion and will most likely extend the required for time for national security 
review (Lally, Glossop, Franklyn & Anderson, 2013:2). The reforms seem to suggest that the 
Canadian government wishes to facilitate the growth of FDI but at the same time, take the 
necessary steps to set up measures to redress national security risks associated with the growing 
influx of FDI 
Despite that many problems still exist with Bill-60 and the ICA; it is indisputable that 
Canada is continuously building a solid regulatory foundation in order to welcome more FDI in 
the future.  Attempts to raise the minimum levels of the FDI threshold required for automatic 
review through the Bill-60 as well as the transparency measures the Bill attempts to implement 
are clear indications of this goal. But more importantly, even without the introduction of Bill-60, 
the minimum threshold for review has already been rising throughout the years. In 2008, the 
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threshold was only 295 million ("Compete to win," 2008: 28). Furthermore, the ICA has always 
been quite friendly to investors. According to 2008 figures, of the more than 1500 non-culture 
investment reviews since 1985, only one has been rejected (Ibid: 28).  And of 98 cultural reviews 
only 3 has been rejected so far (Ibid: 29). Although perception still exists that Canada is 
restrictive of FDI inflows, the reality is far from this perception (Ibid: 29). For one to say with 
much certainty that Chinese FDI would be rejected solely based on the evaluation standards of 
the ICA would therefore be indubitably absurd. 
 
3.13 Sino-Canadian Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement 
 
 On September 8
th
 of last year, Prime Minster Stephen Harper signed a Foreign 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) with China in Vladivostok, Russia. The 
FIPA is a bi-lateral treaty which legally binds host governments to a set of obligations regarding 
their respective treatment on foreign investments and investors ("Canada’s fipa program," 2013). 
In essence, the host governments must insure “non-discriminatory treatments, expropriation, 
transfer of funds, transparency, due process and dispute settlement” (Ibid). According to the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, it is precisely the reciprocal 
nature of this treaty which reinforces Canada as a “stable and predictable destination for foreign 
investments” while at the same time, increases the volume of bi-lateral investment amongst 
signatory states (Ibid). The Harper Administration has been intensely criticized by political 
opponents as well as other non-governmental organizations for signing the agreement. Currently, 
the Sino-Canadian FIPA has not been officially ratified yet—as such, there is still a window of 
opportunity for those not in favour of the agreement to put an end to it. 
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   At forefront of the anti-FIPA wave are the New Democrat Party (NDP) and the Green 
Party. Thomas Mulclair, the leader of the NDP has in the past, spoken out on many occasions 
against the FIPA. He believes that the FIPA will give “Communist China”, the powers to sue the 
Canadian government if the communist nation believes that its rights of expansion are infringed 
upon—which concurrently would also give China powers to challenge Canada’s economic and 
environmental regulations in court (Logan, 2013). Furthermore, Mulcair warns that, “Taken 
together, what FIPA and the CNOOC bid do is remove Alberta’s ability to independently control 
its own natural resource policy while ceding enormous control of our natural resources to a 
foreign power “(Ibid).  On a similar note, Elizabeth May, the Green Party leader has even 
recently rallied party members to raise $150,000 to fund the Hupacasath First Nation’s lawsuit to 
end FIPA ("Stand up to," 2013). This strategy appears to be a desperate move to stop the FIPA 
after an NDP motion on April 22
nd
 to scrap the agreement failed with a vote of 170 to 88 against 
(Siekierski, 2013). Interestingly, both the Conservatives and Liberals voted no against the Green 
Party and NDP (Ibid).  
 The concept of having immediate danger tied to the Sino-Canadian FIPA is an 
interestingly but somewhat unrealistic or even delusional concept. Canada has signed FIPA 
treaties with 21 countries in the past, among them are countries which are—like China—also 
somewhat undemocratic according to Western standards. The Soviet Union FIPA signed in 1991, 
the Egypt FIPA signed in 1997, and the Venezuela FIPA signed in 1998, are a few examples.  
("Foreign investment promotion," 2013). There does not seem to be any major issues concerning 
national security regarding each country’s respective FDI in Canada since signing the FIPA. 
Why then would the Sino-Canadian FIPA be the anomaly which breaks this pattern? 
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3.2 Process and Frameworks in the United States  
3.21 Exon-Florio Amendment and CFIUS 
 
 The regulatory frameworks for evaluating incoming FDI in the US appears slightly more 
complicated than that of Canada’s because regulations are present both at the federal and the 
state level. For the purpose of comparison, this section will be mainly devoted to federal level 
regulations. Section 721 in the Defense Production Act of 1950 is considered to be the chief 
statute which governs the regulation of several types of FDI in the US (Fagan, 2009:10). Section 
721 is known as the Exon-Florio Amendment after the original amendment to the Defense 
Production Act—passed in 1988 amid concerns over the large influx of Japanese FDI (Ibid: 10). 
In theory, Exon-Florio grants considerable authority to the President to investigate and review 
incoming foreign investments.  
“In the words of the Amendment, the president may block an acquisition if ‘there is 
credible evidence that leads the president to believe that foreign interest exercising 
control  might take action that threatens to impair the national security, and if other laws 
except for the IEEPA (International Emergency Economic powers act) ‘ do not in the 
President’s judgement provide adequate and appropriate authority for the President to 
protect the national security in the matter before the president”(Graham & Marchick, 
2006: 34).  
  In practice, however, the President’s role as the principle reviewer and decision maker of 
FDI is often times delegated to CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States) 
(Ibid: 34). Since the Foreign Investment & National Security Act (FINSA) of 2007 was passed, 
the CIFUS does not require an executive order from the president to perform section 721, and 
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can thus evaluate FDI autonomously ("Cfius reform: The," 2008). Among other changes to the 
CFIUS, the FINSA expanded the number of CFIUS members, attempted to ensure additional 
accountability and clarity in the senior levels, and expanded the illustrative list of national 
security factors (Ibid).   
The CFIUS is an interagency committee comprised of the heads of 9 different 
departments and offices chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury ("Composition of cfius," 2010). 
There are 5 other offices which normally observe but may be called upon to participate in CFIUS 
activities in certain circumstances (Ibid). One may believe that there is a higher purpose to why 
the Treasury is designated as chair. Since it is the agency which oversees investment and capital 
flows, the Treasury’s chair status implies that the US is open to investments from around the 
world (Letteri, 2013:1). The following figure is a list comprised of all participants in the CFIUS. 
(Figure 23) CFIUS Participants 
Members Observers 
1. Department of the Treasury (chair) 
2. Department of Justice 
3. Department of Homeland Security 
4. Department of Commerce 
5. Department of Defense 
6. Department of State 
7. Department of Energy 
8. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
9. Office of Science & Technology Policy 
 
1. Office of Management & Budget 
2. Council of Economic Advisors 
3. National Security Council 
4. National Economic Council 
5. Homeland Security Council 
 
 ("Composition of cfius," 2010) 
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3.22 Overview of the CFIUS Review Process 
 
(Figure 24) CFIUS Review Process Flowchart 
 
(Graham & Marchick, 2006: 36).  
 
A key aspect of the Committee is that it makes decisions based on the consensus of its 
members (Daly & Reynolds, 2009). Moreover, the multiple agencies involved in the review 
process often times have their own agenda and interests. As such, their respective assessments of 
any particular case may be different from one another (Fagan, 2009:11). In some situations, with 
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regard to the nature of the transaction, certain Committee members would have a higher level of 
involvement than others (Greenfield & Lange, 2006:11). The Department of Justice in the past 
has been more involved in telecommunication acquisitions which were believed to have potential 
implications for law enforcement’s capability to use wiretapping (Ibid: 11). Despite CFIUS’s 
image of uniformity, an entrenched tension exists between agencies. The Department of the 
Treasury seeks to promote investment and trade policies, and agencies such as the Department of 
Defense aim to enhance homeland security, intelligence capabilities, and law enforcement 
(Graham & Marchick, 2006: 35).    
Unlike the Canadian regulatory system which uses a monetary threshold to determine 
which FDI will undergo review, the CIFUS review process does not have a monetary threshold.  
The CFIUS by statute has the authority to review voluntary filings by businesses on either side of 
the transaction, or through the initiation of the Committee (Fagan, 2009:10). According to 
regulations, CFIUS historically has also allowed any Committee member to issue their own 
notice to the Committee, to request the review of a transaction of their choice (Ibid: 10). This 
type of duality in the review process seems very discouraging to voluntary filings but that is 
often not the case. Traditionally, voluntary filings which has been notified and approved by 
CFIUS would not be investigated again in the future (Greenfield & Lange, 2006: 11). Therefore, 
both parties involved in the transaction have an incentive to file a voluntary notice in order to 
prevent future investigations if either party believes the transaction would have effects on 
national security. Interestingly, despite having powers to file their own notices on transactions, 
the CFIUS members have seldom ever exercised their authority (Ibid: 13).  
Figure 24 describes the process of a typical CFIUS review. The CFIUS operates on a 
stationary deadline (Daly & Reynolds, 2009). Typically, the Treasury is known to assign a lead 
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agency to the case in the initial 30-days of the review process (Ibid). The initial review is 
followed by a 45 day-investigation, and then potentially a 15-day presidential review (Ibid). 
Although presidential review is an option in the review process, the President in most 
circumstances is not called upon to make an executive decision. In fact, the President has only 
made two executive decisions. 
 In 1990, George H.W. Bush blocked Chinese SOE, China National Aero-Technology 
Import & Export’s attempt to invest in Mamco Manufacturing, an aerospace parts manufacturer 
based in Seattle (Fagan, Plotkin, Larson, Elzenstat, Chambers & Sharma, 2012). In 2012, Ralls 
Corporation, a company owned by two Chinese nationals and with ties to China’s Sany Group, 
was denied by Obama from acquiring four wind farms in Oregon which were located close to the 
restrictive airspace of a Naval Weapons Systems Training Facility (Ibid). Interestingly, the only 
two presidential orders to block FDIs are targeted at Chinese companies. The conclusion seems 
to suggest that the regulatory system in the US is indeed biased against Chinese FDI.  
(Figure 25) CFIUS Covered Transactions, Withdrawals, and Presidential Decisions  
2009 - 2011  
Year Number of  
Notices 
Notices 
Withdrawn 
During Review 
Number of 
Investigations 
Notices 
Withdrawn after 
Investigation 
Presidential 
Decisions 
2009 65 5 25 2 0 
2010 93 6 35 6 0 
2011 111 1 40 5 0 
Total 269 12 100 13 0 
("Annual report to," 2012:3) 
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(Figure 26) CFIUS Covered Transactions by Acquirer Nation 2009-2011 
Year 2009 2010 2011 Total 
United Kingdom 17 26 25 68 
Canada 9 9 9 27 
France 7 6 14 27 
China 4 6 10 20 
Japan 4 7 7 18 
India - 1 1 2 
(“Annual report to,” 2012:15) 
 
 If one observes the number of transactions which has been reviewed by CFIUS in the last 
3 years—as shown on figure 25— one can see that most of the transactions were approved. Out 
of 269 notices between 2009 and 2011, only 25 of which were withdrawn through the CFIUS 
review process. This number (9.3% of total covered transactions) does not indicate by any means 
that the CFIUS is very preventative of investments. The majority of notices covered for review 
do not come from China.  As shown in figure 26, the United Kingdom has a total of 68 
transactions covered in the review process between 2009 and 2011, followed by Canada, and 
France. The numbers seems somewhat proportional with each country’s respective FDI inflow 
cost level as shown in figure 13. Despite this, there appears to be a bias in the CFIUS review 
process against Chinese investments. According to figure 13—between 2009 and 2011—the cost 
basis of Japanese ($779,707M), and Indian ($11,553M) investments are both higher than that of 
Chinese ($8,684M) investments. Surprisingly, more reviews are covered by the CFIUS on 
China’s transactions than that of Japan’s and India’s. 
 In most cases, once CFIUS has approved of a transaction the decision is final. However, 
the decisions made by CFIUS can be overturned by Congress using some creative methods. 
Perhaps the most widely known example is the Dubai Ports World, a United Arab Emirates 
based company’s attempt at acquiring 6 major American ports in 2006 (Sud, 2013:1308). At the 
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time both the CIFUS and President George W. Bush has already given approval to the deal (Ibid: 
1308-1309). Many members of Congress had their own interpretation of Exon-Florio amendment; 
they believed CFIUS should “conduct a mandatory 45-day investigation if the foreign firm 
involved in a transaction is owned or controlled by a foreign government” (Jackson, 2013:6).  
In March 8
th
 2006, The House Appropriations Committee voted 62-2 to block the deal by 
inserting the amendment into an emergency supplemental funding bill for military actions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (Walsh, 2006). Although Bush did promise to use his veto powers to overturn 
any congressional blocks, Dubai Ports World decided to give up the acquisition due to the 
immense political pressure (Sanger, 2006). Soon after this event has occurred, the Bush 
administration and CFIUS devised a new component to the CFIUS review process known as the 
Special Security Arrangement (SSA) (Jackson, 2013:6-7). Companies which agree to the SSA 
will essentially allow CFIUS to reopen the review process even after already gaining approval 
from CFIUS (Ibid:7). This change signals to investors a degree of uncertainty, since no decisions 
made by CFIUS will ever be final (Ibid: 7).  
 Moreover, the Congress also has a special committee designated for monitoring Chinese 
Investments known as the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCSRC). 
The commission was created in “October 2000 with the legislative mandate to monitor, 
investigate, and submit to Congress an annual report on the national security implications of the 
bilateral trade and economic relationship between the US and the People’s Republic of China, 
and to provide recommendations, where appropriate, to Congress for legislative and 
administrative action” ("About us," 2013). In the 2012 report, USCSRC recommended to 
Congress that “when undertaking any bilateral investment treaty negotiation with China, the U.S. 
administration should insist upon terms that ensure reciprocity and explicitly address the unfair 
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challenges posed by China’s SOEs in all markets”("2012 report to," 2012: 24). Indeed, it seems 
that there are members in congress who are somewhat distrustful of Chinese investments and are 
actively trying to sabotage Chinese acquisitions. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
 The most noticeable similarity between the process for evaluating FDI in Canada and the 
US is that they both possess some level of politicization. In Canada perhaps because the 
Conservatives are both the majority in the legislature and are the Ministers in charge of the 
review process, dissenting views from the NDP and the Green Party are less likely to affect the 
review process. What is true based on the evidence presented in this chapter is that usually in 
Canada, members in charge of the decision making has no trouble in carrying out the decision. 
This fact alone means there is much more certainty in the decisions made through the Canadian 
regulatory process. As there are only three times when the ICA has been used to block 
investments, it would be difficult for one to say that Canada is biased against foreign investments 
in general. More importantly, there is no hard evidence signalling that the Canadian regulatory 
process is biased against Chinese investments as no Chinese investments have been blocked so 
far. 
In the US, perhaps due to the nature of CFIUS being an interagency committee, multiple 
views affect the consistency of the decisions. This inconsistency is then amplified by the 
authority of the Congress to intervene and steer decisions accordingly their own political agenda. 
Again, there may be a lack of evidence so far to support this observation, but the facts presented 
in this chapter has demonstrated that investing in the US appears much more uncertain than 
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investing in Canada. The Congress, for example, is able to step in and attempt to sabotage certain 
investments which it deems threatening to the US.  
From the CFIUS charts demonstrating higher value/review ratio for Chinese investments, 
the precedence of blocking on Chinese FDI, and the Dubai Ports World case, one may argue with 
some certainty that CFIUS and Congress are somewhat biased against certain foreign 
investments, such as Chinese investments. With the presence of the USCSRC and their 
negativity towards Chinese investments this view seems even more realistic. Importantly, one 
must remember that in most circumstances, the CFIUS review process is quite generous to 
investments under review. In addition, as the CFIUS review process only covers only a segment 
of all Chinese investments, a large number of Chinese acquisitions do not undergo this process at 
all.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 49 
 
CHAPTER 4: THEORY  
 There does not appear to be a single theory available which can fully explain the 
acceptance and rejection of FDI in general. As such, this chapter will not be dogmatically 
championing one school of thought over another. Instead, this chapter will be devoted to creating 
a composite theoretical framework, consisting of multiple theories to explain this phenomenon. 
Created from a comparison of evidence from Canada and the US so far, the theory presented in 
this chapter is designed to be specifically applicable to explaining the trend of Chinese FDI 
deterrence in North America. Through an eclectic approach which drew inspiration from realist, 
constructivist pluralist approaches, this chapter will establish that key differences between the 
evaluation of Chinese FDI in US and Canada rest upon a combination of: the perception of 
Chinese FDI in relation to China’s relative power, and how decision makers may react in 
accordance with such societal perception. The theoretical framework constructed here will be 
used as a guideline to help analyze actual cases of Chinese investments in the proceeding 
chapters.  
 
4.1 Are Chinese FDIs a Threat? 
 
 Various strands of realist theory have been widely used to explain the Sino-American 
relationship in the past. Generally, rather than agreeing that states aim to increase absolute gains, 
most realists believe all states share the common goal of maximizing relative power, power 
anchored on the capability to use force (Toft, 2005:383; Powell, 1991:1304). In the 21
st
 century, 
China’s rise will inevitably clash with American security interests—and hence, the future of 
Sino-American relations is intrinsically an antagonistic one, defined by hegemonic competition 
(Mearsheimer, 2010). More specifically, as the gap in power between China and the US closes, 
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China will try to become a regional hegemon in the Asia-Pacific region, a position long held by 
the US (Ibid).  
Indeed, the amount of evidence suggesting that both China and the US are actively 
attempting to increase their relative gains should not be simply ignored. However, a far more 
complex explanation is required to explain why Chinese FDI in North America is rejected, and 
often viewed in a negative light. There are two fallacies which discredits a pure realist argument. 
First, why was Japanese FDI casted in a negative light in the 1980s if Japan has been an 
American ally? If Japan’s relative power is hinged upon America’s relative power, then it is 
quite improbable for Japanese FDI to pose a threat. Second, why accept some Chinese FDI but 
reject others? If China were to gain relative power via its outward FDI then the rational choice 
would be to reject all Chinese FDI than to reject some.  
Japan in the past has always been regarded as an American ally. Scholars such as Victor 
Cha have suggested that Japan’s relation with the US is very much a patron-client relationship 
(2000). In fact, Japan is so dependent on American security that it makes comprises to be on 
friendly terms with South Korea in fear of American abandonment (Ibid). A US withdraw from 
Okinawa and other military bases would make Japan itself responsible for maintaining defense, 
forcing the island state to commence rearmament—which, would perpetuate anti-Japan 
balancing coalitions, and unforeseeable responses from China and other rival powers (Ibid: 272). 
Japan’s relative power is hence so dependent on America’s that any inclusion of its presence in 
evaluating its FDI in America is unnecessary. 
Despite the fact that Japan’s relative power is almost entirely borrowed from the US, 
Japanese FDI in the US in the 1980s faced similar problems as Chinese investments today. 
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Members of Congress and scholars promoted the view that Japanese investments are a threat to 
the American economy based on the reasoning that Japanese-American trade and investments do 
not occur on a “level playing field” (Milhaupt, 2008:8). This national sentiment came to be 
known as “Japan Inc.”. Those who espouse this view believe that the Japanese “had developed a 
powerful, rapidly growing, purposively managed, and relentlessly self-interested economic 
juggernaut which was posing a fundamental challenge to U.S. economic supremacy” (Yoshida, 
1987: 2).  
 In one case, Fujitsu, a Japanese computer manufacturer attempted to acquire Fairchild 
Semiconductor in 1986 (Wallace, 2002:199). The acquisition was met with an entire range of 
barriers such as anti-trust laws, and investigations under the Defense Industrial Program (Ibid: 
200). The reason was because security concerns were raised on the fact that Fairchild was the 
main supplier of micro-technology such as micro-chips used guide military weapons (Ibid: 200). 
Eventually, strong opposition from Congress to the bid and the politicization of the takeover 
pressured Fujitsu to give up the acquisition (Milhaupt, 2008: 9). Soon after, as an impetus 
derived from the controversy surrounding the case, the US revised the CFIUS review process in 
1988 (Ibid: 9). Surprisingly, by the early 1990s, political controversy over Japanese FDI had 
largely disappeared—and today controversy over Japanese FDI is almost unheard of (Ibid: 14).  
 Looking at Chinese FDI to the US today, it is without a doubt that China faces similar 
issues as Japan did in the 1980s. But if the US truly believes that the influx of Chinese FDI will 
distort the balance of relative power to the favour of the Chinese, then why must the US allow 
any Chinese FDI at all?  As shown by the data presented in the previous chapters, specifically 
chapter 2, there are Chinese acquisitions in a wide range of sectors. This phenomenon forces one 
to ask a simple but important question: are Chinese FDIs as dangerous as they are politicized to 
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be? Certainly it is without a doubt that Beijing is trying to foster the right conditions for domestic 
companies to expand internationally with the promotion of the “Go Out Policy”, which 
essentially is a big hint for Chinese companies that their government will aid them in their efforts 
to expand abroad. 
Needless to say, Beijing sees FDI as an excellent way to diversify China’s massive 
holdings of foreign-exchange reserve, and a good method to gain energy security for the future 
(Jiang, 2010:14). Nonetheless, one should understand that even if Beijing wants to achieve 
certain objectives with an increase in FDI outflow, Beijing’s intentions does not automatically 
equate that Chinese FDIs are threats. In fact, most authors who have commented on the influx of 
Chinese FDI believe that Chinese acquisitions should not be singled out as they do not pose any 
additional threat vis-à-vis FDI from other countries.  
For example, Daniel Rosen and Thilo Hanemann concluded in their report that, “despite 
the special economic arguments rose as a result of China’s statist character, the pattern of its FDI 
in the US to date is “normal,” and predatory or other anti-competitive behavior is better 
confronted with normal domestic law rather than foreign investment screening regimes that 
cannot adequately foresee future action” (2011:51).  Derek Scissors furthermore agrees by 
arguing that since the total size of Chinese investments globally is so miniscule, and that in the 
short term it is unlikely to increase significantly—“it does not pose a major threat to the U.S., 
either in terms of the purchase of American assets or in terms of the expansion of Chinese 
influence around the globe” (2011). Although the authors have fundamentally different policy 
recommendations for the Federal government, they all agree that it would be economically 
beneficial for the US to receive more Chinese FDI (Rosen & Hanemann, 2011; Scissors, 2011).   
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The view that Chinese FDI is a net economic benefit is also shared by scholars in Canada. 
Wenran Jiang has long argued that Chinese FDI in Canada has a positive effect on job creation 
and economic growth (2012). Jiang believes Chinese FDI is safe because the majority of Chinese 
investments in Canada follow strict local business regulations, even SOEs. Because they are 
listed in foreign stock exchanges, they are forced to oblige to international standards (Ibid).  This 
fact sheds some truth to the popular belief that Chinese SOEs are solely the eyes and ears of 
Communist China.  Under the scrutiny of regulatory compliance from the federal and local levels, 
“it is impossible that any of the Chinese companies, now or in the future, will be able to “take 
over” any of our industrial sector, let alone “take over” Canada” (Ibid).  
 
4.2 Perception and Hegemonic Rivalry 
 
From the examination in the previous section, one can obviously see that Chinese FDI is 
definitely not by any means a direct threat to the US. If Chinese FDI is indeed beneficial, and 
furthermore, does not appear to strengthen China’s relative power more than the US, then why 
does the US reject Chinese acquisitions? It is possible that a strong presence of superficiality and 
irrationality is entrenched within the American review system. The deterrence of Chinese FDI 
may not be based upon actual threats but on the subjective perception that such threats exist. 
Here, a distinction must be made between the actual threat of Chinese FDI, and the perception 
that Chinese FDI is a threat. The former can be rationally explained by the notion of gains in 
relative power, while the latter cannot be justified as under the same notion.  To put simply, this 
section will prove that Sino-American economic contestation is crucial in determining the 
perception of Chinese FDI. In other words, China’s growing relative power, specifically its 
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growing economic capabilities will alter how its FDIs are perceived in North America. And that 
within North American countries, differences in treating Chinese FDI are formed on whether the 
country in question is competing with China for economic supremacy.  
One’s “reality is socially defined by the subjective experience of everyday life, how the 
world is understood rather than to the objective reality of the natural world” (Andrews, 2012: par 
6). Humans through their understandings are reflexively aware of their social reality and capable 
of influencing their behaviours accordingly to their own social reality (Guzzini, 2000: 149). 
Knowledge of both the observer and agent, and their respective actions are hence categorized as 
an inter-subjective phenomenon (Ibid: 149-150). Using this logic, the perception of a rising of 
China, may have broader consequences than one may have originally thought. Muthiah Alagappa 
believes that it is precisely the perception of China’s ever growing power which causes states, 
specifically Asian states to take certain precautions against China (1998). The fear and mistrust 
of China is derived from the popular notion held by such states that China is becoming more of a 
competitor both economically and militaristically (Ibid). 
The economic dominance of the US today rests upon the “US economy’s importance in 
global trade, the dollar’s role as a reserve currency and unit of global exchange, and the 
dominance of American markets and institutions in global finance” (Dymski,2001: 2). Authors 
such as Subramanian promotes the view that China’s economy, due to its scale and rapid 
growth—according to the explanation offered by the theory of gravity and convergence—will 
eventually put China ahead of the US and even replace it as the center of the global economy 
(2012). In other words, the growing size and strength of the Chinese economy is a crucial aspect 
of China’s rise.  Combining the elements mentioned: the US being the world’s only hegemon 
may “feel” or believe to be so threatened by China’s economic rise that taking unnecessary 
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precautions against Chinese FDI becomes a necessary response, even if the actual threat of 
Chinese FDI is low or in some cases non-existent.  
GDP is one of the most common tools used to evaluate the scale of a country’s economy, 
and also an accepted indicator of national power. For example, Organski and Kugeler correlated 
their Power Transition theory by using GNP as the parsimonious indicator of political and 
economic power (Elman & Elman, 2003: 129). Later studies and replications done to confirm 
their theory replaced GNP with GDP (Ibid: 129). For the purpose of this thesis, an examination 
of the GDPs of the US, Japan, and China will allow one to easily determine the size and 
capability of their respective economies. 
 For most of post-war Japan, the Japanese economy was in a state of growth and 
industrialization. By the mid-1980s there was a rise in national savings rate, which meant that 
lower domestic demand and lower GDP growth was bound to take place (Madsen & Katz, 2009: 
159). Yet on the contrary, fuelled by the large trade surplus as well as the growing asset bubble, 
Japan was able to put-off such effects and continue rapid GDP growth throughout the 1980s 
(Ibid: 159). To other states, and especially the US, Japan’s growing economy created the 
perception that Japan was a strong economic competitor. And considering that the US was just 
climbing its way up from a decade of stagflation in the 1970s, the economic success of Japan 
must have been a hyper-sensitive blow to the American psyche.  
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(IMF World Economic Outlook Database, 2011) 
Much like views on China today, the 1980s was filled with forecasts of Japan’s eventual 
overtake of the US; Japan was to become the world’s largest economy (Buerk, 2010). To date, 
the best representation of both America’s fear and awe of Japan’s success was Ezra Vogel’s 
highly influential book “Japan as No. 1”. Vogel’s book (1979), which was meant as a “wake up 
call” for Americans, described the attributes of Japanese success—ranging from culture to 
government involvement—and suggested that the US should even try to emulate some of these 
attributes.  Perhaps because views of Japan’s eventual economic domination over the US, 
subjectively, many Americans may have perceived the influx of Japanese FDI as a threat even 
though that might not necessarily be the case. The obvious result was the negative discourse 
surrounding the inflow Japanese FDI throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.  
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When Japan’s asset-bubble bursted in 1991, the Japanese economy was derailed and 
thrown into a decade of stagnation, commonly known as “Japan’s Lost Decade”.  Japan’s 
economy was no longer strong enough for any sane expert to make any insinuations in respect to 
Japan’s economic overtake of America. On the other hand, the US in 1991 began a decade boom 
and unprecedented prosperity, the longest economic expansion ever recorded by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research, which lasted from 1991 to 2001 (Hall, Feldstein, Bernanke, 
Frankel, Gorden & Zarnowitz, 2001). Hence, the perception of Japan in the competition for 
global economic supremacy changed. Japan was no longer viewed as competitor by Americans 
but simply an observer of American supremacy. As a result, the negative discourse surrounding 
Japanese FDI began to end and then disappeared altogether.  
 China today is yesterday’s Japan. After the recent 2007/08 Financial Crisis, the US 
experienced the longest recession since WWII lasting 18 months until June 2009 (The Business 
Cycle Dating Committee, 2010). Without a doubt, the US economy took a big hit in the financial 
sector, and that the road to recovery was projected to be slow (Ibid).  In comparison, China 
during the global recession still experienced GDP growth of 8.5% in 2009 (Zakaria, 2010). 
Commending Beijing’s decisive policies and massive stimulation spending, Fareed Zakaria 
declared China the “winner” coming out of the recession (Ibid).  Although the Chinese economy 
is now experiencing a slow down with annual growth rate estimated to by around 7.5% (Chiang 
&Standing, 2013), given the overall trend of growing Chinese economic power, the US would 
now be more likely perceive China as the next Japan—a new contender for its global economic 
supremacy.  
 Aside from the economic aspect of hegemonic competition—unlike Japan—China is 
capable of competing with the US on several other fronts as well. Although economic strength 
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may be one of the most crucial factors in hegemonic competition, other important factors such as 
militaristic competition should not be ignored. A simple comparison of GDP between countries 
is not enough to accommodate the multi-dimensional nature of great-power competition. Hence, 
a more comprehensive indicator of national capability is needed to justify Chinese hegemonic 
challenge to the US.   
 A widely accepted indicator of national power which encompasses multiple variables is 
the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) created by J. David Singer for his Correlates 
of War Project. The indicator takes into account of 6 different components: total population, 
urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and 
military expenditure (Greig & Enterline, 2011). “This measure is generally computed by 
summing all observations on each of the 6 capability components for a given year, converting 
each state's absolute component to a share of the international system, and then averaging across 
the 6 components” (Ibid).  
TPR = total population of country  
TPR = urban population of country  
ISPR = iron and steel production of country  
PEC = primary energy consumption 
MILEX = military expenditure  
MILPER = military personnel  
CINC = TPR+ TPR+ ISPR+ PEC+ MILEX+ MILPER      
     6 
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(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010) 
 China is shown to have a much higher CINC than the US after 1996; this result is due to 
China’s large population and growing energy consumption. In military spending, however, the 
US in 2007 spent $552,568,000, while China in the same year only spent $46,174,000, a mere 
fraction of American military expenditure (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Since issues with the 
weighting of the components exist, the CINC may not be the best indicator of determining 
whether a state is the global hegemon. Nevertheless, a comparison of CINC across states can 
narrow down the options of potential hegemons to only a few. Furthermore, as shown by the 
decline of Russia’s CINC in the 1990s, and the incline of China’s CINC in the same period, the 
CINC can act as a good indicator of power transition.   
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
(Figure 27.1) Comparison of CINC between 1980-2007 
USA China Japan Canada India Russia
 60 
 
 Due to China’s higher CINC as compared to Japan’s, China’s national capability is much 
higher than Japan’s. This would mean China’s hegemonic challenge to the US is a much more 
comprehensive and realistic challenge than that of Japan’s “single front” economic challenge. 
This logic is based on the argument that Japan is incapable of pursing a militaristic challenge 
with the US due to its status as an American ally—while China is free to do so. As a result of 
China’s capability to challenge the US on multiple fronts, it is conceivable that China is 
perceived to be more of a threat than Japan. When China’s economic size was lower than Japan’s 
in 1990s, China’s higher national capability vis-à-vis Japan may still have caused Chinese FDI to 
be perceived negatively.  For example, despite China being less of an economic competitor to the 
US vis-à-vis Japan, Chinese SOE, China National Aero-Technology Import & Export’s attempt 
to invest in Mamco Manufacturing in1990 was blocked by President Bush (Fagan, Plotkin, 
Larson, Elzenstat, Chambers & Sharma, 2012).   
A series of public opinion polls recently conducted by the Pew Research Center has 
presented a number of very interesting results regarding the global perception of China and the 
US. Since the financial crisis, the world’s perception about the economic balance of power has 
been shifting from viewing the US as the world’s leading economic super power to China (Pew 
Research Center, 2013).  “Looking at the 20 nations surveyed in both 2008 and 2013, the median 
percentage naming the US as the world’s leading economic power has declined from 47% to 
41%, while the median percentage placing China in the top spot has risen from 20% to 34%” 
(Ibid: 4). This perception aligns very well with the trend of China’s economy performing more 
successfully than America’s since the global recession. 
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(Figure 28) World’s leading Economic Power 2013 
 United States % China % Japan % EU % 
Germany 19 59 4 14 
Canada 28 56 7 4 
Britain 33 54 4 4 
United States 39 44 7 4 
Russia 28 32 17 9 
China 46 30 1 6 
Japan 67 20 4 4 
Statistically significant pluralities and majorities are in bold 
(Pew Research Center, 2013: 34) 
Furthermore, when observing China’s international favourability, the US has a higher 
percentage of being less favourable towards China when compared with Canada, and the other 
regions (Pew Research Center, 2013: 25). When looking at the change in favourable% between 
2007 and 2013; the US dropped by 5% from 42% while in Canada it dropped by 9%. from 52%. 
Logically, it may be wrong to simply assume that opinions on China will be uniform across the 
US. But, as shown by the evidence presented, it is possible that the economic rise of China shifts 
the overall opinion of China in the country in a negative direction. 
(Figure 29) China’s Global Favourability 2013 
 Favourable% Unfavourable% 
Canada 43 45 
United States 37 52 
Africa 72 15 
Latin America 58 22 
Asia 58 35 
Middle East 45 52 
Europe 43 47 
Regional Medians 
(Pew Research Center, 2013: 25) 
With these data in mind, there is possibility that the US is more likely to reject Chinese 
FDI because Americans feel challenged by the rise of China even if the particular Chinese FDI 
poses very little or no threat at all. In comparison, because Canada is not a superpower or will 
ever be in the near future, it is possible that Canadians feel less threatened by the rise of China as 
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there is no hegemonic competition between the Chinese and Canadians. This view matches well 
with the evidence—that more Canadians chose to designate China as the next economic 
hegemon, and felt more favourable towards China than the Americans.  Since Canada feels less 
challenged by a rising China, Canada is less likely to reject Chinese FDI than the US.  
Aside from the main evidence presented above, the theory’s logic also lends from a 
careful analysis of the sectorial distribution of Chinese FDI in chapter 2, and the comparison of 
institutions in chapter 3. From chapter 2—comparing the sectorial data of Chinese FDI in the US 
and Canada, one can see that the concentration of Chinese FDI in Canada is more focused in a 
few sectors, while in the US; Chinese FDI is more spread out between different sectors. As 
allowing more Chinese FDI to continue flow into certain sectors would possibly mean that the 
host country is generally at ease with Chinese FDI, this would indicate that perhaps Canadians 
are less threatened by Chinese FDI than Americans. In addition, from chapter 3, the history of 
the review process as well as value of Chinese FDI to review ratio both suggest that in the US, 
Chinese FDI is more likely to be rejected than in Canada.    
Again, it is important to reiterate that while China’s growing relative power may be a 
threat to North America, and that China may be a hegemonic rival to the US—in the realm of 
FDI, such threats often to not exist.  The theoretical framework is simply proposing that actual 
Chinese threat hinged upon Sino-American hegemonic competition negatively influences the 
perception of Chinese FDI. Thus, the theory is able to explain that Chinese FDI is more 
welcomed in Canada than in the US.  
 
4.3 Pluralist Decision Model  
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 Given the relevance of social constructivism, and that different interests exist amongst 
the members of the CFIUS and Congress, a pluralist decision model is ideal for explaining the 
review process. “While relatively few deals have been blocked by a negative CFIUS finding or a 
recommendation not to apply, almost all major deals were subject to politicization by the media, 
members of Congress, the security community, domestic industry incumbents, and groups 
generally critical of China”(Rosen & Hanemann,2011:62).The pluralist model of policy making 
assumes that the general public has the capacity to impact foreign policy; the leaders in some 
cases will follow the will of the public when making policy decisions (Neack, 2003: 104-105).  
According to Baskin, “the increasing complexity and the quickening pace of change in modern 
society prompt an increase in both the penetration of society by government and cooperation 
among individuals in behalf of their shared interest”(1970:73).   
The leaders and the masses form a relationship where the leaders advocate for their 
shared interests; thus the leaders represent the interests of particular groups which they are 
sometimes themselves a part of. Usually, Pluralists also assume that no single group is the most 
dominant and that power in the decision making process is fragmented amongst different groups 
(Dye, Zeigler & Schubert, 2012: 12-14). When interests of different groups clash, bargaining and 
attempts to reach a compromise usually occur (Ibid: 12-14). Such instances where leaders 
compete with each other and make compromises to reach certain group objectives are common 
in the American Congress, where Congressional groups and committees often compete during 
the policy making process.   
 In Congress, there are two major groups which have opposing opinions on China, the 
Congressional China Caucus (CCC) and the US-China Working Group (USCWG). The CCC is 
concerned with the political and strategic impact that China’s rise will have on America while 
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the USCWG is more interested in the economic opportunities which the US can gain from 
building a good relationship with China (Sauvant, 2009: 94). In essence, the USCWG is 
generally the more pro-China group while the CCC is usually the anti-China group. Aside from 
groups, Congress is divided into committees that have extraordinary influence in passing 
legislative inactivates. There are several committees that had asserted themselves on issues 
concerning Chinese FDI. They include The House Ways and Means Committee, and its 
subcommittee on trade, the House Armed Services Committee, House Energy and Commerce 
committee and the Finance Committee in the Senate (Ibid: 97). 
In a statistical analysis of voting in Congress, it is shown that the disposition of Congress 
members are influenced by the level of economic ties their district has to China (Sauvant, 2009: 
96). Congress members from districts that have high levels of export to China, and financial 
activity tend adopt a favourable position towards China (Ibid: 95-96). For example, states on the 
West Coast such as Washington and California, due to their proximity and closer economic ties 
to China are more favourable towards China (Ibid: 95-96). On the other hand, members from 
districts which import from China, military and have manufacturing industries which compete 
with China tend to be unfavourable towards China (Ibid: 95-96). As one may have guessed, 
those who support China tends to be a part of the USCWG and committees which tends to be 
pro-China, while those who feel negative towards China join the CCC and anti-China 
committees (Ibid: 95-97).   
Similarly in Canada, group competition can be observed as well. Rather than having 
congressional groups and committees, cleavages in Canada are apparent between federal parties. 
As shown in the previous chapter, the Conservatives and Liberals are more supportive of Sino-
Canadian business relations by supporting the FIPA while the Green Party and NDPs are less 
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supportive. This result is quite unsurprising as each party appeal to their own unique group of 
constituents. The NDPs have traditionally garnered support from unions and have taken an anti-
trade stance on most trade issues (Hughes, 2012). For the NDP, arguing against the FIPA and 
other trade agreements may be a way or at least be interpreted as a way to protect the job security 
of the union members.  On the other side of the spectrum, the Conservatives are very supportive 
of trade agreements. They believe that trade helps in “opening new markets for Canadian 
businesses and creating good new jobs for Canadian workers” ("Trade," 2013).  
Looking at the results of the 2011 Federal Election, most of the votes casted for the 
Conservatives were from the Western provinces such as British Columbia and Alberta. The 
NDPs on the other hand, received most of their votes from Eastern Provinces such as Quebec 
and Newfoundland ("Canada votes 2011," 2011). The decision of the Conservatives to go 
forward with the FIPA is unsurprising as Western provinces are more economically linked with 
China. For example, China is British Columbia’s second-largest trading partner ("Canada-china 
agreement good," 2012). British Columbia exported 5.1 billion to China in 2011, a 24% increase 
since 2010 (Ibid). One should understand that despite such group cleavages exist in Canada as 
well, Canadians have not rejected any Chinese FDI to date. Whereas in the US, Congress is 
known to intervene and block Chinese acquisitions—in Canada, the anti-investment parties have 
not been successful in directly blocking Chinese acquisitions. 
 
4.4 Institutional Differences 
 
 Before moving into explaining how institutional differences in Canada and the US may 
affect the outcome of Chinese FDI evaluation, one must understand how this paper defines 
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institution. Taking an endogenous perspective widely accepted by Rational Choice 
Institutionalist (RCI), institution is defined here to be a set rules which are shaped by the 
preferences and choices of the actors involved (Shepsle, 2005: 2). “They (Institutions) do not 
compel observance, but rather reflect the willingness of everyone to engage with one another 
according to particular patterns and procedures. The institutional arrangements are, in this view, 
focal and may induce coordination around them” (Ibid: 2). Taking into account all actors’ roles, 
preferences, choices and capabilities: institutions are simply the heuristics which have emerged 
from the equilibrium of all the factors and choices involved (Ibid: 3; Greif & Laitin, 2004: 634).  
 Under the structural constraints of institutions, actors are assumed to be making rational 
decisions aimed at maximizing their utility (Jørgensen, Pollack & Rosamund, 2007:32). In other 
words, by weighing all alternative choices available to them under a certain set of rules, actors 
choose the choice which may benefit them the most (Ibid: 32).  While policymakers have their 
own preferences, they also act as agents who are responsible for the interests of their electorates. 
This relationship, widely espoused by RCI scholars, is known as the Principle-Agent model. 
“The principle enters into a contractual agreement with a second party, the agent, and delegates 
to the latter responsibility for carrying out a function or set of tasks on the principal’s behalf” 
(Kassim & Menon, 2003:122).  One must note that the principle does not need to be an 
individual, it can also be an organization which wishes to delegate tasks to an individual or 
another organization on its behalf (Ibid: 122).   
This section will essentially theorize that due to institutional constraints in Canada, 
Canadian policymakers do not have many choices for influencing the evaluation of FDI. Often 
times, alternative options which can influence the denial of certain FDIs do not exist. On the 
contrary, due to the institutional structure of the US, American policymakers may choose 
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alternative options to influence the course of the FDI evaluation process. In Canada, the 
principles are less easily able to influence the acceptance or rejection of Chinese FDI because 
their agents have a limited set of choices to do so. In the US, the opposite is likely to be true to 
the wider range of options available to American policymakers.    
Since in the Canadian Westminster System—there lacks the institutional structure of 
checks and balances instilled in the American Presidential System—the majority of Canadian 
lawmakers often do not have the capability to challenge the decision of the administration to 
accept Chinese FDI even they wished to do so. The reason being is that the Conservative 
government have a majority in the House of Commons. Currently in Parliament, Conservatives 
hold 162 seats, while every other party combined are holding only 142 seats ("Party standings," 
2013). This institutional advantage is coupled with the fact that Conservatives are also the 
ministers in charge of the review process via the ICA.   
Challenges in Parliament made by other parties to pass legislations which may lead to the 
denial of a particular Chinese FDI is not very likely to succeed. A major reason is because both 
the ruling and opposition parties appoint party whips to insure that on important votes, most of 
their party members vote accordingly to the interests of the party ("Officers and officials," 2013).  
In addition, as the opposition party’s shadow cabinet does not have the authority to evaluate 
incoming FDI, policy makers opposing a certain transaction have no viable institutional means of 
deterring it. Hence, group interests from individuals and organizations have less capability to 
influence the outcome of FDI evaluations.  
In the US, due to the partitioned nature of Congress and CFIUS, external interests to 
reject Chinese FDI are more capable of eventually dominating the decision making process. 
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Despite the fact that CFIUS makes its decisions based on a consensus, different departments 
have different objectives. The Department of the Treasury has an agenda to enhance investments 
and trade (Graham & Marchick, 2006: 35). Have such objectives mean that the Secretary of the 
Treasury is a supporter of most FDI. On the Other hand, the Department of Defense aims to 
enhance intelligence capabilities, law enforcement, and homeland security (Ibid: 35). Generally, 
the Secretary of Defense would be unsupportive of FDI which he/she believes would pose a 
security risk.  While the Secretary of the Treasury usually has the most decisional power, in 
certain circumstances decisional power shifts to other members (Greenfield & Lange, 2006:11).  
For example, the Department of Justice would usually have more decisional power when CFIUS 
evaluates FDI in telecommunications (Ibid: 11).  
Moreover, one must note that unlike Canadian Ministers, the appointments of American 
Department Secretaries are not entirely based on party affiliation. The President of the US 
appoints many senior officials in the judicial and the executive branch of government based on 
the advice of the Senate (Carey, 2012:1-2). Since the President and the Senate shares this power 
of appointment, compromises are sometimes made between the President and the Senate on the 
nominees (Ibid). Furthermore, due to the system of checks and balances between the Senate, the 
House of Representatives, and the President, a more complex range of factors are considered 
when appointing officials in the US. For example, although Democrats currently comprise the 
majority in the Senate, in the House of Representatives, Republicans are the majority. As a result, 
Obama, despite being a Democrat may have made a compromise earlier this year by appointing 
Chuck Hagel, a Republican, to the office of Secretary of Defense. In essence, the diversity of 
officials amongst CFIUS members insures that diversity of group interests are taken into account 
when FDIs are evaluated.    
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Other than CFIUS, congressional committees and groups have considerable influence in 
the evaluation of FDI. The reason being is that congressional committees are at the center of the 
American lawmaking process—“party leaders or presidents rarely eclipse their policymaking 
power” (Groseclose & King, 2000). The operation and structure of the committees in the House 
and the Senate are very similar; they both have permanent standing committees which have 
legislative jurisdiction ("Committee faqs," 2013; "About the senate," 2002). Legislative 
jurisdiction gives standing committees the power to “consider bills and issues and recommend 
measures for consideration by the House” (“Committee faqs,” 2013).  While similarly in the 
senate, “A committee’s influence extends to its enactment of bills into law. A committee that 
considers a measure will manage the full Senate’s deliberation on it” ("About the senate," 2002). 
Therefore, the committees are easily capable of blocking certain FDIs by introducing legislations 
in Congress. The most well-known example is the Dubai Ports World case, where The House 
Appropriations Committee voted to block the deal by inserting an amendment into an emergency 
supplemental funding bill for military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan (Walsh, 2006). 
The composition of the standing committees in the House and the Senate are both 
respectively based on the ratio of partisan composition in the House and the Senate ("Committee 
faqs," 2013; "About the senate," 2002).  Currently, the majority of committee members in the 
House are Republicans, while the majority of committee members in the Senate are Democrats. 
This institutional construct will allow group interests to be more represented:  Republican 
interests on FDI could be represented in the committees of the House while Democrat interest 
could be represented in the Senate. All in all, the intuitional construct of the CFIUS and the 
congressional committees allows a multitude of group interests to influence the FDI evaluation 
process in the US. 
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The endogenous conceptualization of institution is also capable of partially explaining the 
change in American attitudes towards Japanese and Chinese FDI. The reason is that although 
institutions may reinforce itself, exogenous circumstances in the environment can cause 
institutions to change and react to the environment (Weingast, 1996).  In other words, “although 
sometimes decisive individuals or coalitions are not prepared to change the way business is 
conducted”, they will change when critical circumstances arises (Shepsle, 2005: 3). Using this 
logic, it is conceivable that in the US, the institution oriented itself accordingly to the rise and 
decline of Japan. When Japan was capable of challenging the US economically, the institutional 
norms or equilibrium at the time would disfavour Japan’s FDI. China’s rise similarly, would also 
influence the American institution to orient itself negatively towards Chinese FDI.  As this 
hypothesis requires further examination and evidence, it is difficult to validate this causal 
relationship at the moment.  
 
4.5 Political and Ideological Preferences of Policy Makers 
 
Although China and the US are attempting to build a constructive relationship, there has 
always been a mutual strategic distrust between the two powers (Wang & Lieberthal: 2012). 
According the authors, this mutual distrust arises from a difference in political traditions and 
culture, a lack of appreciation for each other’s policy process, and a perception in the narrowing 
of power between the two countries (Ibid: 5-6). As the gap in power between China and the US 
closes, it is possible that political, cultural as well as ideological preferences of individual policy 
makers will play larger role in the evaluation of Chinese FDI. In other words, the perception of 
China as a hegemonic challenger increases the significance of American policy makers’ 
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ideological and political preferences in the evaluation of Chinese FDI.  In addition, due to the 
intuitional structure of US, such preferences should be able to more easily affect the FDI 
evaluation process in the US than in Canada.  
In terms of differences in political systems, one can argue that China’s authoritarian, one 
party dictatorship perpetuates distrust in the US. American leaders believe that democracies are 
inherently more trustworthy and legitimate than Authoritarian systems as Authoritarian systems 
are less stable. (Wang & Lieberthal: 24).  From the outside, the Chinese system is perceived to 
be intentionally concealing its core political process—for example, the appointment of its 
political leaders and its civil military interactions (Ibid: 24)  Due to the lack of transparency in 
China’s authoritarian system, American policy makers are unable to accurately judge the motives 
and intentions of Chinese policies (Ibid: 24). As a result, China’s rise coupled with its 
authoritarian system negatively affect China’s image and can also negatively affect the image of 
Chinese FDI amongst American leaders.   
Differences in political tradition and culture also unfavourably influence the perception 
of China amongst American policy makers. Due to the culture of Liberalism in North America, 
and its role in defining American national identity, “decrying a ‘China threat’ and the evils of 
communism becomes a way of defining what it means to be a freedom-loving twenty-first 
century American” (Gries, 2009: 225). In order to appeal to their electorates, this shared national 
sentiment has been used and espoused by politicians across the political spectrum (Ibid: 225-
226).  When speaking about China, Democrats such as President Barrack Obama, Hilary Clinton, 
and Nancy Pelosi have all adhered to the narrative of protecting individual liberty against an 
authoritarian state (Ibid: 226). Republicans, such as Christian Conservative Congressman 
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Christopher Smith—aside from also adhering to this general narrative—also decry China for its 
lack of religious freedoms (Ibid: 226).  
 In addition, the ideological preferences of policy makers may also be a factor in their 
decisions to reject or accept Chinese FDI. In the US, generally, Republicans are more likely to 
view Chinese FDI negatively than Democrats. In a recent 2013 survey of Republican and 
Democrat attitudes towards foreign countries, 52% of Democrats are found to be favourable 
towards China, while only 32% of Republicans are favourable towards China (Newport & 
Himelfarb, 2013). Of course, one should note that as the Republican Party is quite fragmented, 
not all Republicans are unfavourable towards China. Republicans espousing a more Libertarian 
view would be likely to view Chinese FDI more positively.  
 In Canada, ideological cleavages of policy makers are also found. In Canada, “leftists 
and rightists organize their opinions about the world in different ways” (Cochrane, 2010). In a 
survey of party preferences, members of the Canadian Alliance (merged into the Conservative 
Party of Canada in 2003)  are 7 times more likely to support the opinion that job creation should 
be left to the private sector than members of the NDP (73% vs. 8%) (Ibid). The Conservatives—
due to ideological orientation towards free market-principles—should be more likely support 
Chinese FDI. The NDPs due to their socialist and pro-union leanings are more likely to oppose 
Chinese FDI. While members of the Liberal party–generally as centrists between the left and the 
right would most likely to sometimes oppose, and other times support Chinese FDI.  Due to 
China’s hegemonic competition with the US, ideological justifications for opposing Chinese FDI 
in the US is expected to be amplified. While in Canada, as no Sino-Canadian competition exists, 
ideological justifications espoused by leaders to oppose Chinese FDI—while still a recognizable 
factor—should be less significant in the decision making process.   
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Assuming that as a democratic country Canada also distrusts China due to a difference in 
political systems, and that the Canadian political culture is also dominated by the ideals of 
Liberalism, such factors would also be less significant in Canada for the same reason as above.  
In addition, since the FDI evaluation process in Canada is not as influenced by external interests 
as the US due to institutional differences, all of the factors mentioned in this section will also be 
less significant in Canada vis-à-vis the US.   
 
4.6 FDI in Strategic Sectors 
 
 There are several definitions and interpretations in the literature on what strategic sectors 
really are. According to Soete, the term “strategic” in the context of industrial policy can be 
defined as a: military one, technological one, trade one and an industrial one (1991: 54). In terms 
of military strategy, industries which can provide products and technologies to the military have 
strategic value (Ibid: 54). High-tech industries, such as micro-electronics, which are able to 
enhance a country’s technological capabilities, have strategic value (Ibid: 55). There is also 
strategic value in industries which make up a significant portion of the country’s exports, 
fulfilling its strategic value in trade (Ibid: 55). Lastly, there is strategic value in industries with 
many forward and backward links in the economy; many citizens of that particular country are 
either directly or indirectly involved in the industry (Ibid: 56).  
In the context of the theoretical framework, if the origin country and the host country are 
engaged in hegemonic competition, the origin country’s FDI would be considered riskier to the 
host country than FDIs from other countries. In the energy, resource, and technology sectors are 
commonly considered to have more strategic value than other sectors. Due to the importance of 
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these sectors, there is possibility that the perception of threat from a rival country’s FDI in any of 
these sectors would be amplified on top of the existing risk of inward FDI from a non-rival 
country in these sectors.  Any aspect of the transaction which would bear even a slight chance of 
risk would soon be perceived as a threat and a reason for dismissing the origin country’s FDI. 
China’s telecommunications technology provider, Huawei, for example, has been accused many 
times for spying for the Chinese government, and had several of its acquisitions dismissed by 
CFIUS (Robertson & Engleman, 2012). 
When looking at non-strategic sectors where pre-existing risk is minimal, inward FDI 
from a rival country would also elevate the perception of risk. The best example would be the 
still on-going acquisition of Smithfield Foods, a Virginia based pork producer by China’s 
Shuanghui International Holdings (Clarke, 2013). Unlike investments in the energy or 
technology sectors which would potentially aid the Chinese military through the transfer of 
resources and technology, investments in pork production is unlikely to aid China’s military in 
any way. Normally, such investments should be passed with ease. However in this case, concerns 
were raised by House Committee on Energy and Commerce about the potential of Shuanghai 
exporting Smithfield’s production of raw “heparin, a blood-thinner widely used in heart surgery 
and kidney dialysis that is derived from pig intestines” to China (Ibid).  
Hence, Chinese FDIs in the US strategic sectors are often accused of working for the 
Chinese government in some way or form—ranging from spying to the transfer of products 
and/or technology. In Canada, since China is not a rival, the capacity for such threats to 
negatively influence the outcome of Chinese acquisitions should be lower. The reason being is 
that whether Chinese FDI is in a strategic or non-strategic sector, Chinese FDI will be treated 
with more normalcy in Canada. Furthermore, it is possible that as group interests are less capable 
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of penetrating the evaluation process in Canada, Chinese investments in both strategic and non-
strategic sectors are less likely to be politicized and rejected. While in the US, as American 
institutions enable more influence from group interests, Chinese FDI is more likely to be 
politicized and rejected in both strategic and non-strategic sectors in the US. 
 
4.7 Addressing Counter-Arguments: Culture, Political Systems, Historical 
Institutionalism, Economic Interdependence 
 
 At this point, one may think that differences in culture, and/or political systems—without 
including the context of hegemonic competition—are alone capable of explaining the evaluation 
of Chinese FDI in North America. The following will demonstrate that each of the two 
explanations when alone, are incapable of offering an adequate explanation. Doing so will 
further validate the logic of the theoretical framework which rests upon the presence of 
hegemonic competition. 
Would cultural differences between China and the US be the key factor in decisions to 
reject Chinese FDI? Borrowing traits from Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis, 
it is possible for one to erroneously argue that China’s “Sinic” culture, and America’s “Western” 
culture are so inherently different that the rejection of Chinese FDI is solely based on mutual 
cultural cleavages (1997). Using this logic, one can erroneously believe that the rejection of 
Japanese FDIs in the 1980s can also be explained because Japanese and American culture were 
also defined as different cultures by Huntington. If one takes a closer look at the volume of FDI 
inflow, one can see that both India and Brazil (Figure 13), have much higher volumes of inflow 
than China. Yet, there has not been widespread politicization of Indian and Brazilian FDI in the 
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US. This result implies that differences in culture between the origin and host countries alone are 
not salient in influencing FDI rejections.  
Furthermore, from Chapter 3, it was determined that Chinese FDI in fact has a higher 
volume to CFIUS review ratio than does Indian FDI. What makes Chinese culture so different 
from Indian culture that there are more FDIs covered as a result? In addition, if indeed culture is 
central to the evaluation of FDI, then why is Japanese FDI much less politicized today than in the 
1980s? What caused the Japanese culture to be more acceptable to the US in the last 20 years? 
Again, the change in the orientation of Japanese FDI in the US can never be accounted for if 
culture is used to explain FDI trends. These are merely a few of a myriad of issues which needs 
to be addressed if a cultural explanation on the matter is used.  
 
(U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2013) 
One may further argue that it is the difference between political systems which 
determines whether Chinese FDI is accepted. This line of logic can be formulated from the 
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results of Lieberthal and Wang’s recent report (2012) mentioned earlier in this chapter. China is 
authoritarian, and the US is a democracy—a democracy would be less likely to accept FDIs from 
an authoritarian country due to mutual distrust. The politicization of FDI from Japan, a 
democratic country, in the 1980s alone decreases the validity of this line of logic. But more 
importantly, if one observes the inflow of FDI from Singapore, an authoritarian country, 
statistics show that the total value of FDI from Singapore is much higher than the total value 
from China. In fact, the amount of Singaporean FDI inflow in 2012 is more than 5 times that of 
China in the same year. Despite this amount, political outrage regarding Singaporean FDI is 
nothing comparable to that of Chinese FDI in the US. At this point, claims on the grounds of 
political differences anchored on inherent differences between authoritarian and democratic 
governments appear quite weak as well.   
If one still firmly believes that cultural and political differences are the main causes 
behind FDI rejections, one only needs to glance at the Canadian statistics. According to Figure 5, 
total value of Chinese FDI in Canada between 2005-2011 surpasses that of India, and is close to 
that of Brazil’s. If culture had any impact, then Canada would have politicized FDIs from Brazil, 
deeming its “Latin American” culture to be too intrusive to Canadian “Western” culture. Why 
has not such an event occurred? If political differences had an impact, then why has Canada 
welcomed investments of a higher total value from China than from India, a democratic country? 
Again, such arguments are effortlessly shown to have many inherent flaws. Any scholar making 
a case for either of the two arguments needs to first redress these paradoxical conundrums which 
may only lead to failure.      
The Historical Institutionalist (HI) approach may be correct in pointing out that 
institutional differences between Canada and the US may be a determinant in the evaluation of 
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Chinese FDI; it does not accommodate the change in FDI attitudes over time. One basic 
assumption of historical institutionalism is known as path dependency. Most HI scholars believe 
that, “outcomes at a critical juncture trigger feedback mechanisms that reinforce the recurrence 
of a particular pattern into the future” (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002:699). Likewise, “once 
established, patterns of political mobilization, the institutional rules of the game, and even 
citizens’ basic ways of thinking about the political world will often generate self-reinforcing 
dynamics” (Ibid: 700). The argument for path dependency falters when the change in which 
Japanese FDI is treated before the 1990s and after the 1990s is accounted for.   
If the HI approach is correct—given the reinforcing nature of previous decisions—then 
one should currently see the US rejecting Japanese FDI even more so than that of Chinese FDI 
because the rejection of Japanese FDI had occurred earlier in history. This outcome has never 
occurred. Therefore, although differences in institutions between Canada and the US may 
account for the evaluation of Chinese FDI, the HI approach cannot fully account for the change 
in FDI orientation. While in Canada, although the ICA has been used to block investments from 
Australia and Malaysia in the resource and energy sectors, Chinese FDI into these sectors has 
never been formally blocked by the ICA. Again, it would appear that the logic of path 
dependency is not completely accurate, as one would expect Canada to block Chinese 
investments as well if a pattern of blocking FDI was existent.   
Lastly, an important counter-argument against the theoretical framework is the notion 
that China and the US are economically inter-dependent; as China’s economy and relative power 
grows; China will be unlikely to challenge the hegemonic status of the US due to Sino-American 
economic interdependence. Hence, China is not likely to be a threat, and its economic growth is 
incapable of negatively influencing American attitudes on Chinese FDI. Although this argument 
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is correct in recognizing that a close economic relationship exists between the two powers, it 
fails to truly recognize the nature of Sino-American economic interdependence, and the potential 
threats derived from the relationship itself.   
This inter-dependence between the two powers is commonly known as ‘Chimerica’: “a 
world economic order that combined Chinese export-led development with US over-
consumption on the basis of a financial marriage between the world’s sole superpower and its 
most likely future rival” (Ferguson & Schularick, 2011:1-2). Although the relationship has been 
stable for most of the past decade, after 2007-2009 Financial Crisis, the relationship became less 
capable of reinforcing itself (Ibid: 4-5). While Chinese authorities recognize that the heavily 
indebted America is less and less capable to act as a consumer of last resort, they still implement 
competitive currency interventions to devaluate the Yuan against the dollar in order to continue 
export-led growth (Ibid). China’s interventionist policies pose a threat to the US and the world. 
“It limits America’s recovery by overvaluing the dollar in key Asian markets and it continues the 
dangerous reliance of the American economy on cheap money, excessive consumption and 
imports of savings from the rest of the world” (Ibid: 4).  
Aside from the destabilizing effects of Chinese interventionist policies on the US, and 
potentially the world, China’s holding of American Securities may also give it enough leverage 
to hurt the American economy in the long-run. In 2012, China was holding “21.9% of total 
foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities, 12.3% of U.S. privately-held Treasury securities, 
and 7.4% of the total level of U.S. federal debt (privately held and intergovernmental)” 
(Morrison & Labonte, 2013:13). Currently China’s accumulations of American securities do not 
pose any significant risk as a large selling of these securities would devaluate the dollar which in 
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turn will both decrease the value of China’s dollar-denominated assets, and America’s capability 
to import Chinese goods (Ibid: 13). However in the long-run:  
“There is future danger in the possibility that we will run sustained, gigantic deficits. The 
 longer these last, the more likely it is that US treasuries will become relatively less 
 attractive, thereby tipping the balance of influence toward China. The US could come to 
 need Chinese purchases more than the China’s needs American bonds, yet another 
 argument to control the federal budget” (Ibid: 14) 
While Sino-American economic-interdependence has benefits for both countries, the 
continuation of such relations may possibly endanger both countries than one would expect. 
Hence, it is erroneous for one to argue that China has no capability to threaten the United States. 
Whether it wants to do so intentionally or unintentionally however is another question for debate.   
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
The theoretical framework presented in this chapter is very easy to comprehend. China, 
like Japan is capable of challenging the US economically. But unlike Japan, due to China’s 
greater national capability derived from a number of components—most importantly, China’s 
military capability—China is capable of engaging in a more comprehensive hegemonic 
challenge with the US. As a result of China’s capacity to challenge the US on multiple fronts, 
perception of China in the US is generally more negative as compared to Japan.  
Whether or not the rise of China actually poses a genuine threat to the US is not the main 
focus of the theory. The theory presented here is only suggesting that in regards to Chinese 
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FDI—Chinese investments do not pose any significant threat to American national security. The 
rejection of these Chinese investments may be based more on the subjective perception that they 
are a threat than on them being actual threats. In other words, this national sentiment is amplified 
and shown to be the most prevalent when the host country reviews investments from a 
hegemonic challenger.  
In regards to the decision making process, leaders tend to align themselves accordingly to 
the interests of their electorates. The influence of groups in the US to sabotage Chinese 
acquisitions is much stronger than the influence of groups in Canada. Again, this assumption is 
also based on the identification of whether China is a hegemonic rival to the host country. But 
more importantly, one must note that institutional differences between Canada and the US 
increases the tendency for negative perceptions of Chinese FDI to be more represented in the US, 
than in Canada.  This notion is based on the logic that policymakers are more capable of 
representing the interests of their principles in the US, than in Canada—hence , allowing 
negative perceptions of Chinese FDI to more easily penetrate the decision making process in the 
US. 
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(Figure 31) Theoretical Framework Flowchart 
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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDIES 
In the previous chapter, a theoretical framework for explaining FDI was constructed. This 
chapter will evaluate the framework by using actual cases of Chinese FDI in North America. To 
do so, cases of Chinese FDI will be selected from both Canada, and the US. They will be 
discussed in detail and then compared to see if the framework is indeed applicable in explaining 
their story. There are two specific points to test for when evaluating the framework. First, 
whether the decision makers are influenced by group interests and second, whether the Chinese 
FDI in question bears a significant level of real threat. The reason being is that the theoretical 
framework assumes the threat of Chinese FDI is largely subjective. Policy initiatives to reject 
FDI with minimal threat in the US would validate the theory, while policy initiatives to reject 
FDI with minimal threat in Canada make the theory less valid. 
To test the first point, instances of disuniformity, and adherence to different group 
interests amongst leaders capable of influencing the decision making process will be examined.  
As described in the previous chapter, in a Pluralist Decision Making Model, leaders often contest, 
bargain, and make comprises on policy decisions. In other words, if the theory is correct, there 
should be instances where leaders disagree with each other, and/or follow the special interests of 
certain groups when evaluating Chinese acquisitions. In Canada, contestations and interest 
adherence between leaders will exist but their ultimate impact on the rejection of Chinese FDIs 
will be minimal. While in the US, the voice for blocking Chinese FDI should be much more 
influential on the final decision.   
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(Figure 32)  Three Threats Framework 
Threat Category I: 
Denial/Manipulation 
of Access 
FDI gives a foreign-controlled supplier power to delay, deny, or restrict 
the supply of goods and services critical to the normal functioning of the 
host country’s economy, including the military industrial defense base 
Threat Category II: 
Leakage of Sensitive 
Technology/Know-
How 
FDI allows a foreign-controlled entity to transfer technology and 
expertise which can be used in a harmful way by the entity or its 
government against the host country 
Threat Category III: 
Infiltration, 
Espionage, and 
Disruption 
FDI gives the foreign-controlled entity the capacity to infiltrate, spy on, 
and sabotage the supply of goods and services critical to the normal 
functioning of the host country’s economy, including the military 
industrial defense base 
(Moran, 2012:24-30) 
The best way to test the second point is by applying Theodore Moran’s Three Threats 
Framework on the FDI examined. Moran intends his framework to be used by governments as a 
guideline for evaluating whether inward FDIs pose a real national security threat. According to 
Moran, “application of this framework in Canada and elsewhere would help to dampen 
politicization of individual cases, enabling swift and confident approval of those acquisitions 
from which genuine national security threats are absent” (2012:40). If the FDI fails to meet most 
of the conditions set by the Three Threats Framework, then the FDI is most likely to possess an 
insignificant level of threat. “For any of these three threats to be credible, the affected industry 
would have to be tightly concentrated, with a limited number of close substitutes, and high costs 
associated with switching to one of those substitutes” (Ibid: 6). With this notion in mind, 
understanding the supply of a particular firm in comparison to that of other firms will be most 
critical in assessing whether a foreign takeover of the firm will meet threaten the host country. 
(Figure 33) Expected Results From Most Cases 
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The cases chosen from the US and Canada are some of the most controversial cases of 
Chinese FDI from the last 10 years. They are chosen to represent how Chinese FDI in different 
sectors are addressed in the American and Canadian review processes—with emphasis on 
notable cases in the energy and technology related industries. The reason is that from chapter 1 
(Figure 19), the energy and information technology sectors were shown to be the sectors which 
contain the greatest amounts of Chinese FDI. In addition, they are also most relative to the 
threats described in Moran’s Three Threats Framework. In Canada, since most Chinese FDIs are 
in the energy and resource sectors (Figure 11), the majority of notable acquisitions valued above 
$344million are also in the energy sector. As only cases above this minimum threshold are 
reviewed in Canada, cases selected for Canada are unintentionally all in the energy and resource 
sectors. In addition, as most controversial cases in Canada had high valued transactions; cases 
involving the largest transaction values so far were chosen.  
 
5.3 Cases from the United States 
 
5.31 China National Offshore Oil Corporation—Unocal, 2005 
 
 In 2005, CNOOC, a Chinese SOE attempted acquire Unocal, a California based oil 
Company for $18.5 billion (White, 2005). Unfortunately for the Chinese Oil giant, political 
controversy surrounding the takeover and opposition from congress eventually pressured 
CNOOC to drop the deal (Ibid). “Members of Congress, many of them heavily lobbied by 
Chevron, lined up to attack CNOOC's bid. They said that the company benefited from sweetheart 
financing from the Communist government in Beijing and that the purchase would be a 
dangerous energy grab by China” (Ibid). Being the only offer still on the table after CNOOC has 
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withdrew its bid, Chevron was successful in purchasing Unocal for $17.9 billion (Baker, 2005). 
Frustrated, CNOOC stated, “This political environment has made it very difficult for us to 
accurately assess our chance of success, creating a level of uncertainty that presents an 
unacceptable risk to our ability to secure this transaction”, and deemed political opposition 
“regrettable and unjustified” ("China's cnooc drops," 2005). 
 Believing that the CNOOC could take action to threaten and impair American national 
security, the House voted 398-15 on June 30
th
 to pass H. Res. 344: a resolution which forces 
President Bush to immediately review the deal if Unocal Corporation enters into an agreement, 
acquisition, merger, or takeover by CNOOC (Barrionuevo, 2005;"H. res. 344," 2005).  
Essentially, this resolution extended the CFIUS review period beyond the normal time frame by 
asking the president to intervene. The resolution was introduced by Richard Pombo, a 
Republican representative of California who has received an estimated amount of $21,500 from 
Chevron since 1989 (Brier, 2005). Pombo stated on the house floor that “We cannot afford to 
have a major U.S. energy supplier controlled by the Communist Chinese…If we allow this sale 
to go forward we are taking a huge risk"(Barrionuevo, 2005). He may have been implying that 
China will manipulate and cut America’s supply of oil if the deal was successful. Through this 
congressional vote, one could see that the majority of lawmakers harbored negative attitudes 
towards this investment at the time.  
 Weeks before the vote, Richard D'Amato, the chairman of the USCSRC expressed 
concerns on the congressional hearing regarding the acquisition.  He stated, “By any conceivable 
standard, the U.S. government should see and treat this proposed transaction as a non-
commercial transaction with other motivations and purpose” (Bullock & Xiao, 2005). In addition, 
other voices of opposing came from members of the House Armed Services Committee such as 
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Duncan Hunter. He expressed that the “infrastructure, drilling rights and exploration capabilities 
Unocal uses to provide energy on the open market all represent strategic assets that affect U.S. 
national security”(Ibid).  
Nonetheless, amidst the waves of anti-CNOOC sentiment in Congress, there are a few 
leaders who are in favour of the deal. Jim Moran, a Virginian representative said that blocking 
the deal could potentially be more dangerous than allowing it (Barrionuevo, 2005). “They are 
holding a financial guillotine over the neck of our economy, and they will drop that if we do 
things like this that are not well considered”, he said, and “If we don't let them invest in western 
firms, what are they going to do? They are going to invest in Iran or Sudan and make those 
governments much stronger than they are today” (Ibid). Furthermore, Congress was warned by 
Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and John Snow, Treasury Secretary to not 
create any trade barriers with China (Guerrera, McNulty & Kirchgaessner, 2005). So far, it is 
quite obvious that a different perspective on the deal exists in Congress. And that Congress had 
directly intervened to try making the deal difficult to close.  
The important question is now to ask if a genuine threat exists. Using Moran’s Three 
Threats Framework, the first question to ask is if CNOOC is capable in manipulating the supply 
of oil against American economic and security interests. Despite the political rhetoric, CNOOC 
would be incapable of influencing America’s oil supply and consumption in any significant 
manner. The reason is simple, Unocal’s domestic oil production only accounts for less than 1 
percent of America’s total energy consumption (Jiang, 2005). Even If CNOOC chose to 
manipulate oil production and delivery, CNOOC would only be able to hold less than 1 percent 
of the American energy supply as hostage—which will likely cause only a minuscule fluctuation 
in the price of oil. In essence, “the amount of oil produced from Unocal’s reserves would not be 
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large enough to affect global oil prices or supply conditions” (Hufbauer, Sheth & Wong, 2006: 
51). The deal fails to meet Threat I. 
Is there a chance that the deal will allow Chinese governments to acquire technology 
which could be used in a malicious way against the US? Unocal’s oil drilling technology is not 
very special. CNOOC is easily capable of acquiring Unocal’s oil drilling technology from other 
sources such as private vendors and contractors (Hufbauer, Sheth & Wong, 2006: 51). There is 
little difference as to whether CNOOC chooses to access such technology from Unocal or not. 
There is no evidence to show that CNOOC would use the technology to harm the US. In contrast, 
with better oil drilling technology and expertise, CNOOC would be able to produce more oil and 
thus increase the global energy supply (Moran, 2012:33). Hence, there is more benefit from 
CNOOC using Unocal’s technology than harm. The deal also fails to meet Threat II.  
Would CNOOC sabotage the oil they produce or use their oil as a form of surveillance? 
This course of action seems very unlikely. CNOOC making their petroleum products defective or 
even harmful to the end-user would undoubtedly face waves of legal challenges, risk getting shut 
down for violating product safety and quality regulations, and not to mention a considerable 
devaluation on their stock prices which would trouble their investors. As a business traded on the 
New York Stock Exchange, sabotaging their products would be quite detrimental to their traded 
value. As for surveillance, it would be outright impossible for anyone to use petroleum products 
to spy on someone else. The CNOOC therefore does not meet Threat III requirements very well. 
This case fits the theoretical framework quite well. First, it demonstrated that interest based 
cleavages exist in Congress on Chinese FDI. Second, Congress attempted to use legislative 
means to obstruct the deal. Third, the deal posed minimal threat to American national security 
interests.  
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5.32 Huawei Technologies—3Com, 2007-08 
 
 In September, 2007, Huawei, the largest Chinese telecommunications-equipment 
provider and Bain Capital, an American private equity firm announced that they would together 
spend $2.2 billion to buy 3Com Corp, a computer-network company based in Marlborough, 
Massachusetts (Cimilluca, Dean & White, 2007). Bain would be buying about 80% of 3Com 
while Huawei would buy the rest (Ibid). In the past, due to 3Com’s financial difficulties, it 
partnered with Huawei in a joint venture known as H3C Technologies, which was 51% owned 
by Huawei and 49% owned by 3Com (Hochmuth, 2006). Through H3C, 3Com rebranded and 
sold its ethernet switching and routing technology in China where there has been a growing 
market for wireless equipment (Barfield, 2011:11). “One commentator has stated that 3Com 
became primarily a Chinese vendor with an American façade” (Ibid: 11). Eventually in 2006, 
3Com bought the rest of H3C from Huawei for $1.26 billion, acquiring control of all assets in 
mainland China (Ibid: 11).  
Interestingly, while 3Com’s complete buyout of H3C was not blocked by the Chinese 
government; Huawei’s attempt to acquire a mere 16.5% of 3Com was blocked in the US. After 
CFIUS signaled that the deal was not going to go through, Bain and Huawei immediately 
dropped the purchase in early 2008 (Quinn, 2008). As with the CNOOC-Unocal deal, the 
majority of Congress seemed to have strongly opposed this deal as well. Most notably, 8 
Republicans led by Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Floridian Representative on the House Foreign 
Affairs committee, argued for and successfully implemented a legislation which would force the 
Bush administration to reject the deal (Kelly, 2008; "Congress to probe," 2008).In addition, a bi-
partisan group of congressmen, led by the chairman of the House Energy and Commerce 
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Committee, John Dingell started an independent investigation while the deal was under review 
by CFIUS ("Congress to probe," 2008). 
 In a letter the group sent to the Treasury Secretary, it stated “Given that 3Com 
Corporation manufactures communications network components—some of which it supplies to 
the Pentagon, including firewall technology—this transaction raises significant concerns about 
its potential effect on the national security of the US” ("Us congress probes," 2008). One of the 
main reasons why there is much concern over Huawei is because its founder Ren Zhengfei was a 
former Chinese military officer (Einhorn, 2007). Coupled with the fact that the control of 
Huawei was privately held in the hands of an exclusive group, Congress feared the possibility of 
Huawei leaking sensitive technology to the Chinese government (Ibid).   
Despite this overwhelming anti-Huawei sentiment, there is evidence pointing to the 
reality that some congressmen are supportive of this deal. For example, there are members of 
Congress who have requested the Bush administration to “defend its decision in 2007 to allow 
certain Chinese companies to import sensitive military technologies without licenses” (Weisman, 
2008). More interestingly, there are American leaders who are indirectly or possibly directly 
involved in the acquisition. Bain Capital for example, was founded and at one time 100% owned 
by Mitt Romney, who was a presidential candidate in 2008 (Blodget, 2012). Romney had left 
Bain Capital before the Huawei-3Com deal, but his severance package from the company still 
allowed him to gain shares of Bain’s profits (Confessore, Drew & Creswell, 2011). Usually, the 
business model of private equity firms is to make a profit by reselling companies they have 
bought (Confessore, Drew & Creswell, 2011). So theoretically, if Bain was successful in 
acquiring 3Com and then resells its shares, it would have made a large profit doing so. Since 
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Romney held no official post during the time of the deal, it is difficult to say whether he had any 
influence on the decision.  
Perhaps more controversial than Romney’s connection to Bain was Treasury Secretary 
Henry Paulson’s connection to Goldman Sachs, an investment banking firm. Goldman Sachs was 
at the time advising 3Com on the deal and interestingly, Paulson’s previous job was Goldman’s 
chairman and CEO ("The 3com-huawei deal," 2007). In the past, Paulson had already sold $500 
million worth of his Goldman shares before becoming Secretary of the Treasury, but he still 
recused himself from his position on the CFIUS in order to avoid a conflict of interest problem 
(Gelsi, 2006; Ibid). Although one cannot know for certain what Romney’s and Paulson’s 
positions were on the deal, they both were undeniably connected to companies which want to 
make the deal work.  
Would Huawei’s control over the distribution of 3Com’s network products affect the US 
economy in a significant way? The answer is likely to be no. The reason being is that there are 
several large companies in the US that produce similar network electronics as 3Com. In the early 
2000s, 3Com was facing so much competition from Cisco Systems in the high-end segment of its 
router business that it mostly abandoned the American market, and decided to sell older products 
to China through H3C (Barfield, 2011:11). This means that Huawei’s primary market is China 
rather than the US. Looking at the market share of customer-premises equipment (telephones, 
switches, routers, residential gateways, set-up boxes, for use with communication service 
provider) in 2006, 3Com only has a 3% share of the North American market (Krapf, 2007). 
Furthermore, when Hewlett-Packard announced to acquire 3Com in 2009, 3Com had a 35% 
market share in China but very little market shares in North America and Europe (Ricadela, 
2009). 3Com’s low market share means that its supply of network products can easily be 
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mitigated by that of larger companies if Huawei chose to cancel distribution to the US after 
acquiring 3com. Clearly, the deal fails to meet Threat I. 
(Figure 34) 2006 Customer-Premises Equipment Market Share 
 
(Krapf, 2007) 
 Does buying 3Com give Huawei technology and expertise which may be used harmfully 
against the US? In addition, would Huawei be able to use 3Com to sabotage the America’s 
supply of consumer-premises equipment, or use 3Com’s products to spy on America?  The 
answer to both of these questions is likely to be no. In the 8-K filing 3Com submitted to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, it stated, “Huawei will not have any access to sensitive 
US-origin technology or US government sales as a result of this transaction” (Duffy, 2007). 
There is no direct connection between 3Com and the American government because 3Com only 
sells to the government through resellers and integrators (Ibid). Moreover, 3Com does not have 
any products that are designed specifically to be used by the government (Ibid). To put simply, if 
the American government does not choose to use 3Com’s products in fear of the potential harm 
such products may bring its networks, all security threats to its networks will be mitigated. Even 
 93 
 
if Huawei indeed gained “harmful technologies” from the deal, Huawei will have no way to use 
them in a harmful manner against the US.  
 More importantly, according to the 8-K, since Bain, an American company will control 
83.5% of 3Com, “Bain Capital will be able to make all operational decisions for the company, to 
set budgets, to spend money, to make investments, and to hire and fire personnel. Huawei will 
not have any control over the operation of the business” (Duffy, 2007). Any malevolent 
intentions Huawei may have towards US would be too difficult to be carried out under these 
conditions. When asked about the deal’s security concerns, Xu Zhijun, Huawei’s chief marketing 
officer said, “If the US government is concerned about Huawei…Cisco is everywhere within 
China. Who should be more concerned?”(Parker & Taylor, 2008).  From the evidence provided, 
one can see that Huawei does not pose a security threat under both Threat II and III categories. 
As with the CNOOC case, this case also exhibited evidence of congressional cleavage based on a 
difference of interests, legislative opposition to reject the deal through CFIUS, as well as the lack 
of any significant security threat.  
At this point, it is important to address the most recent claims of Huawei being a security 
threat. Michael Hayden, the former head of America’s Central Intelligence Agency recently 
accused Huawei of spying for the Chinese government. In the interview, he stated that “Huawei 
shared with the Chinese state intimate and extensive knowledge of the foreign 
telecommunications systems it is involved with” (Wardell, 2013). His words however, are not 
very credible. First, Hayden is a corporate director of Motorola Solutions which is currently in a 
lawsuit with Huawei, its competitor (Ibid). His accusations may simply be Motorola’s strategy of 
denouncing Huawei’s brand status, perhaps to influence the outcome of the lawsuit in their 
favour. Second, Hayden has given no details on the evidence of the reports (Ibid). Hence, from 
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these two points, it is possible to assume that Hayden is acting in the interests of Motorola than 
on behalf of national security. 
From the Chinese side, Huawei has openly declared that they are not involved in spying 
for Beijing. Eric Xu, Huawei’s deputy chairman refuted Hayden, saying Hayden’s claims are 
merely “political noise” (Osawa, 2013)  Xu said, “On the one hand, Mr. Hayden refuses to reveal 
a single piece of evidence to support his claim of our wrongdoing, yet on the other hand, he 
states that it is up to Huawei to prove otherwise” (Ibid). Although one cannot be absolutely 
certain that Huawei does not engage in spying, such reports from the media should be taken with 
a grain of salt. From the evidence gathered so far, recent claims appear to fit in with the 
theoretical framework—suggesting that different group interests play a role influencing the 
outcome of Chinese FDI evaluations in the US. 
 
5.33 Sany Heavy Industry/Ralls Corp—Oregon Wind Farm Projects, 2012 
 
 In October of 2012, Ralls, Sany’s subsidiary in the US filed a lawsuit in a Washington 
District court against President Barrack Obama and CFIUS chairman, Treasury Secretary 
Timothy Geithner (Helman, 2012). Sany’s move is very bold as in most cases, companies would 
immediately withdraw their bids after an executive block. According to Xian Wenbo, Sany 
Group’s director, “Everybody knows we have received unfair treatment in the US. The order was 
issued by President Obama. If we don't sue him, who do we sue?” (Shih, 2012). Obama’s block 
is also very interesting as this is the second time that an executive order has been issued to block 
a foreign investment since 1990 when George H.W. Bush rejected China National Aero-
Technology Import and Export Corporation acquisition of MAMCO Manufacturing (Pace, 2012). 
Sany and Ralls argue that the executive block issued by Obama and recommended by CFIUS on 
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their plans to build 4 wind projects in Oregon was unconstitutional (Ibid). Currently, Sany is one 
of China’s leading heavy equipment manufacturers, very much like the Caterpillar Inc. in 
America. Sany hopes to use Ralls’ wind turbine projects as a way for the company to gradually 
enter the green energy market (Rapoza, 2012).  
 The trouble for Ralls first started after it purchased land in Oregon for constructing wind 
projects (Zhang, 2012). A local navy base soon contacted Ralls, asking the company to relocate 
the construction to another location due to the close proximity of the project to the base (Ibid). 
The base was known to conduct “training for bombing, electronic combat maneuvers and 
develop drones” in the area (Hu, 2012).  Ralls agreed and then proceeded to file a voluntary 
CFIUS notice (Zhang, 2012). After Obama was informed by CFIUS, in September he ordered 
Ralls to divest all of its interests its wind projects in 90 days, and remove all of its installations 
and property on the site in two weeks (Hu, 2012). In the order issued by Obama, it states, “There 
is credible evidence that leads me to believe that Ralls …and the Sany Group…and senior 
executives of the Sany Group, who together own Ralls…, might take action that threatens to 
impair the national security of the US…”(2012).  Interestingly, no further explanation on the 
“evidence” was given. In the statement by the Treasury after Obama’s order, it cited that the 
location of the project being too close to the military base was a cause for the block ("Statement 
from the," 2012).  
 Why would Obama issue this order? One strong possibility is that he wanted to appeal to 
voters whom dislike Chinese investments and Chinese economic policies in general during the 
2012 presidential campaign. During the campaign season, Mitt Romney fiercely criticized 
Obama for being too soft on China (Palmer, 2012). The Romney Campaign focused on the 
problem of China being a “cheater” that manipulates its currency to “steal” American jobs (Ibid). 
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This messaged was targeted to citizens in states such as Ohio where many manufacturing jobs 
were lost (Ibid). Romney stated, “When a country artificially holds down the value of their 
currency, it means that the products that they sell to us are artificially cheap. And that means that 
American companies that are making these same products, they go out of business if their 
Chinese products are so much cheaper than the real costs behind them” (Ibid). Unlike 
congressional delegates, Obama’s role as President makes him obligated to take into account of 
the interests of all Americans. In essence, Obama’s block may be an attempt to appeal to voters 
in swing states such as Ohio whom believed they lost manufacturing jobs to China.  
  Does the construction of wind-farms give Sany the capability to threaten America’s 
supply of Energy? The answer is an obvious no. Considering that Sany will be constructing 
wind-farms which were non-existent in the first place, Sany would be increasing the supply of 
energy rather than diminishing it. If one simply observes the total consumption of energy (Figure 
35), renewable energies consist only of a small percentage of total American energy 
consumption. Wind energy, moreover, only consists of about 1.2% of total American energy 
consumption ("U.s. renwable energy," 2012). Considering these statistics, Sany’s wind-projects 
would only be a fraction of a fraction of energy consumed by the US. Since a large number of 
alternatives to the supply of energy exists, any damage Sany would even be capable of doing to 
the American energy supply is insignificant. The deal does not meet Threat I requirements. 
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(Figure 35) United States Total and Renewable Energy Consumption by Source in 2011 
 
("U.s. renwable energy," 2012) 
 Would Sany be capable of transferring technology and expertise to China from this 
project? Doing so is not possible because Sany is not acquiring American wind-farms but trying 
to acquire the land and approval from the US to start their own wind projects. It would be quite 
illogical to imply that Sany would steal their own technology and expertise by operating their 
own wind farms. Sany therefore also fails to meet Threat II.    
 The biggest worry CFIUS has appears to be the potential of Sany using one of the Wind-
farms close to the Navy base to spy on American military activity. The location of the wind farm 
itself may meet the requirement for Threat III. However, the location was not an issue either 
because Sany agreed to move the location of their project 1.5 miles southward after it was 
contacted by the navy ("The invisible hand," 2012). To CFIUS this new location was still 
considered too close. CFIUS issued several interim orders over the summer for Sany to halt and 
withdraw the project (Ibid). Facing political pressure, Sany tried to negotiate the abandonment of 
the wind project close to the military base without compensation if the company was allowed to 
keep the other 3 (Ibid). This of course failed. If Sany intended to drop the project close to the 
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base, then Sany would have had no capability to spy on the base at all. Hence, the deal also does 
not meet Threat III.  Although there does not seem to be strong contestation between leaders in 
the Sany case, the President’s decision can be attributed to his consideration of group interests 
rather than to the presence of actual threat. For the most part the case also fits well with the 
theoretical framework. 
 
5.4 Cases from Canada 
 
5.41 China Minmetals—Noranda, 2004-2005  
 
 Perhaps the most controversial case so far of Chinese FDI in Canada is Chinese SOE, 
Minmetals’ bid in 2004 to acquire Noranda, a Canadian mining company. The proposed bid was 
estimated to be approximately $7 billion (Keller, 2004:1). Soon after the bid was announced, the 
deal became very politicized—garnering criticism from across the political spectrum. Critics 
brought up issues such as “human rights, environmental protection, corporate social 
responsibility and a more expansive definition of Canada’s national interest” (Ibid: 2). Some 
scholars believe that the deal primarily failed because of union opposition and that the federal 
government introduced Bill C-59, an amendment to the ICA, which toughened Canada’s 
investment screening criteria (Zhang & Chen, 2004: 38). Although one can argue that these two 
factors played a role in the outcome, the relationship of the two factors and the outcome is 
undeniably indirect. Unlike the US where CFIUS played a direct role by issuing orders and/or 
recommendations for the Chinese firm under review to withdraw, Canada has never used the 
ICA to block Chinese investments.  
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In fact, by early 2005 the politicization and media debate over the deal had halted 
(Salzman, 2005). The reason being is that Noranda had decided in March to purchase its 
competitor Falconbridge Limited, which it had already owned a 59% share of ("Noranda to 
take," 2005). The value of the new amalgamated company, which was estimated to worth $14 
billion, discouraged Minmetals from purchasing Noranda (Ibid). Instead, Minmetals and 
Noranda in March started talks of a strategic alliance (Ibid). Bill C-59 was introduced in late 
June, meaning that the changes it made to ICA were never applied in time to review the 
Minmetals-Noranda deal. The Bill C-59 after introduction also never became law (Bhattacharjee, 
2009: 3). Certainly, one may argue that talks of ICA reform was the reason why Noranda chose 
to ignore Minmetals was because more stringent investment screening measures would 
potentially reject the deal. Since no direct relation is however present between the ICA and 
Minmetals’ withdraw, it is unclear whether Canada intended to block the deal or not. 
 The NDP caucus in October 2004 expressed several concerns regarding the nature of 
Canada’s review process. They demanded the Liberal government to thoroughly investigate the 
deal, and supported the creation of a parliamentary review committee to review committee to 
review inward FDI ("Ndp mps call," 2004). Brian Masse a Windsor NDP Member of Parliament 
(MP) and industry critic stated, “I cannot seriously believe that in the past 19 years, every foreign 
investment in Canada has been in the net benefit to Canada, as the act states they should 
be…Human rights, workers’ rights and the overall economic stability of the regions affected 
must be taken into consideration” (Ibid). The NDP’s position is quite unsurprising as several 
major labour unions in Canada oppose the deal. In a statement from the Canadian Auto Workers 
Union on the takeover it stated:  
 100 
 
“In effect, Canada is becoming a colony once again, and China is the colonizer. Our 
economic relationship with China is quickly coming to resemble our relationships with 
previous colonial powers - first Great Britain, then the US. Overcoming our status as a 
raw material supplier - a "hewer of wood and a drawer of water" - has been a central 
economic concern for Canadians since before Confederation …Now, with China 
becoming a new and dominant force in our economy, the tendency for Canada's economy 
to revert to that of resource supplier will be doubly strong” ("Statement on the," 2004). 
In addition, the National Director of the United Steelworkers Union sent a letter to Prime 
Minister Paul Martin, expressing concern that the Minmetals had only consulted with the 
management but not with the Union (Zhang, 2010: 49). 
 Aside from unions and social democrats, opposition came from members within the 
Liberal party who thought SOEs should not being purchasing private Canadian firms. David 
Kilgour, a Liberal MP, said, “That if one commercial company was taking over another, nobody 
would bat an eyelash…but this is a branch of a government department in China” (Austen, 2004). 
Roy J. Cullen, another Liberal MP remarked, “What's the business of a government in operating 
a natural resources company? Is there a net benefit to Canada in this? Personally, I need some 
convincing” (Ibid).  
Despite these attacks on the deal, the Liberal government did not succumb to creating a 
parliamentary investigative committee to further scrutinize the deal (Ibid). Although 
politicization exists, the government’s efforts in reaction to directly stop the deal were minimal 
aside from introducing Bill C-59. According to the Minister of Industry David Emerson, even 
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Bill C-59 was not introduced due to the increase of Chinese interest in Canadian resource 
companies (Antkiewicz & Whalley, 2007: 212).  
Would Minmetals’ takeover of Noranda meet Threat I? Noranda is the 9th largest 
producer of copper and the largest producer of zinc in the world (Austen, 2004). To test for 
Threat I, the supply of the two minerals will be examined. Doing so will shed light on whether a 
Chinese takeover of Noranda will give the Chinese enough leverage over the supply of Canada’s 
minerals to hurt the Canadian economy. 
 As one can see from the figure 36, with only a 2% of total copper production, Noranda’s 
supply of copper can be easily be substituted by that of larger firms such as Teck Cominco and 
Vale Inco. If Minmetals’ attempted to curb the supply of copper to Canadians, the effects of such 
actions will be insignificant—both on the price and supply of copper. What about the supply of 
zinc? From figure 37, one can see that the amount of copper China produces annually exceeds 
that of all other countries.   
 
(Coulas, 2008: 16.3) 
2% 
28% 
20% 
9% 
41% 
(Figure 36) Total % of Copper In Concentrate Produced by 
Canadian Mines in 2006 
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Teck Cominco
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HudBay Minerals Inc.
Other
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(Figure 37) World Zinc Mine Production, 2006-2008 
 
(Panagapko, 2008: 56.7) 
 In 2005, China produced 2,776,000 tonnes of zinc while Canada produced 723,000 
tonnes (Panagapko, 2008: 56.22). The magnitude of Chinese zinc production raises an important 
question, why does China need to take over Noranda in order to manipulate the supply of zinc? 
In 2006, Canada imported 3,052 tonnes of zinc sulphate from China, which is more than the 
import of US and the rest of the world combined (Ibid: 56.18). China can simply withhold the 
global supply of zinc on its own and doing so will be more effective on global supply and price 
than simply withholding the supply of zinc from a Canadian firm. Looking at domestic zinc 
consumption in 2006, which takes into account of domestic shipments and imports, Canada uses 
191,466 tonnes, a bit less than 1/3 of the total production of 723,000 tonnes (Ibid: 56.1). If 
Minmetals indeed attempted to curb the supply of zinc, Canada could fulfill the gap in domestic 
zinc demand simply by exporting less zinc and allocating more towards domestic consumption. 
Considering the abundance of supply for both zinc and copper even under threat conditions, the 
deal is unlikely to meet Threat I requirements.  
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 Would Minmetals acquire the technology and expertise to hurt the Canadian economy by 
acquiring Noranda? The chance of the Chinese SOE doing so is unlikely. Borrowing the logic of 
the Threat II assessment used from the CNOOC-Unocal deal, with improved mining technology 
and expertise, Minmetals and China would most likely be able to harvest more minerals both 
domestically in China and globally. This outcome will result in a larger global supply of 
minerals—quite the opposite of hurting the Canadian economy, because Canadians will be able 
to access cheaper and larger quantities of minerals if global supply increases. Furthermore, there 
are no reports suggesting that Noranda’s mining technology can be applied militaristically by the 
Chinese. Obviously, the deal does not meet Threat II requirements.  
 Lastly, would Minmetals be able to use Noranda’s minerals to sabotage or spy on Canada? 
If Minmetals does seek to sabotage its products, the results will not be very effective. As shown 
in the Threat I assessment, the supply of zinc and copper can be substituted if Minmetal’s 
products are defective. If the products were dangerous, Minmetals will most likely be shut down, 
while other suppliers profit from Minmetals’ loss. In addition, using minerals to spy would be an 
impossible feat to accomplish—meaning chances of spying are very unlikely. The deal also fails 
to meet Threat III requirements. This case overall fits the theoretical framework because the deal 
itself was not directly blocked by the ICA, group interests played a role in shaping Bill C-59 but 
had no direct influence on stopping the deal, and finally, the FDI itself was not a threat.  
 
5.42 Sinopec—Syncrude Canada, 2010 
 
 In April 2010, Sinopec, one of China’s largest oil and gas companies made a $4.65 
billion bid to purchase 9.03% of Syncrude, an Alberta based company that produces synthetic 
crude from oil sands (Koven, 2010). The 9% share was put on sale by ConocoPhillips in the 
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previous year (Ibid). Interestingly, the Chinese SOE’s $4.65 billion bid was significantly higher 
than the market value (Ibid). As with the previous case, there was much opposition from 
parliament towards the deal. Although it was unclear whether the government wanted to block 
the deal or not in the previous case, this transaction was easily approved under the ICA review 
process. Members of the Conservative government were very supportive of this deal. On the 
nature of the review process, Industry Minister Tony Clement said, “I have approved the 
application by Sinopec ... to acquire control of the ConocoPhillips Partnership because I am 
satisfied that the investment is likely to be of net benefit to Canada” (Nickel, 2010).  
 There are some Conservatives such as Calgary MP Rob Anders who were worried that 
China would manipulate the supply of strategic resources in their own interests—such views 
however, were not very publicized (Clark, 2010).  Opposition, as with the previous case mostly 
came from the NDP. On the potential that Sinopec would be exporting bitumen to China, NDP 
Nathan Cullen remarked, “The Prime Minister is breaking his own fundamental promise not to 
export raw bitumen to countries with lower environmental standards. He is exporting raw 
resources and Canadian jobs” (McCarthy, 2013). These voices of opposition, as shown by the 
ICA approval of the deal were ineffective at contesting the outcome. 
 Would Sinopec’s acquisition allow it to manipulate and hurt the Canada’s supply of 
crude? First, considering that Sinopec will only be holding a minority stake of 9%, any decision 
to withhold the distribution of crude to Canadians would have to be approved by the other larger 
stakeholders. “There are seven other partners in Syncrude who control the remaining 90.97 
percent”, Clement stated, “This transaction will not change the level of Canadian control of 
Syncrude, which will remain at 55.97 per cent” ("Ottawa oks china," 2010). Chances of other 
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stakeholders agreeing to such this preposterous and financially irrational demand would be very 
low. This fact alone makes Threat I a near impossibility. 
 So what if Sinopec was able to channel 9% of Syncrude’s oil to China?  9% of 
Syncrude’s production would amount to 11.9 million barrels per annum or 32,550 bpd, which 
only accommodates for 0.4% of China’s daily oil demand (Jiang, 2010: 24). This amount would 
only fill 6.2% of Enbridge’s notorious 525,000 bpd capacity Northern Gateway pipeline, which 
still has not been built (Ibid: 24). Undoubtedly, China’s capacity to hurt the Canadian economy 
by withholding oil is quite insignificant. Furthermore, without cost-effective means such as 
having a pipeline connecting Alberta to British Columbia so the oil may be shipped to China, 
China will find “stealing” Canadian oil to be a difficult feat to accomplish (Ibid: 24). Thus, 
clearly the deal does not meet Threat I requirements.     
  Would China be able to steal drilling technologies and expertise from Canada and use 
them against Canadians? The drilling technology Syncrude uses are mostly for the special 
purpose of extracting oil from bitumen sands, a relatively unconventional form of oil. By 2010, 
Canada had discovered 1.73 trillion barrels of bitumen, about 66% of all bitumen discovered in 
the world (Attanasi & Meyer, 2010: 124). Partially due to the availability of more accessible 
forms of oil, Russia and Kazakhstan—where the second and third largest deposits of bitumen are 
located—do not commercially extract their bitumen deposits (Ibid:124-125). Canada remains the 
only country in the world which commercially extracts its bitumen deposits (Ibid: 124).  If China 
came into possession Syncrude’s advanced extraction technologies—in the short-term and very 
possibility in the long-term it would have trouble finding a use for them; other than of course, 
applying them for use in Canada. The deal hence also failed to meet Threat II.  
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  Finally, since Sinopec holds only a 9% share of Syncrude, and that 9% of Syncrude’s 
production is quite insignificant, Sinopec does not have the authority to sabotage Syncrude’s oil, 
nor will doing so instigate much damage to the Canadian economy. The deal, thus also does not 
clearly meet Threat III requirements. This case proves the theoretical framework because the 
deal was approved through the ICA, interests within parliament to undermine the deal were not 
successful, and finally, the deal was not a threat as shown by applying the Three Threats 
framework.        
 
5.43 CNOOC—Nexen, 2012  
 
 The largest Chinese investment so far in Canada has been the CNOOC acquisition of 
Nexen, a Canadian gas company based in Alberta for 15.1 billion ("Cnooc completes $15.1-
billion," 2013). After first announcing the bid in July 2012, the Conservative government 
approved the deal in December under the ICA, justifying that the deal would bring a “net benefit” 
to Canada (Ibid). Unlike previous FDIs examined, CNOOC had to gain approval from both 
Canada under the ICA, and the US through CFIUS. The reason being was because Nexen 
operates some oil extraction platforms on American territory, in the Gulf of Mexico (Rampton & 
Haggett, 2013). American legislators approved this deal without many concerns (Ibid). The 
decision was unsurprising as the majority of Nexen’s assets are in Canada. While in Canada, the 
deal faced harsh criticisms from parliament.  
 The NDPs were among the first to cast the deal in a negative light, arguing that the 
government should not follow free-market principles in regards to the takeover. In September, 
Nathan Cullen, House Leader for the Official Opposition remarked, “We think this could 
potentially be very harmful to the Canadian economy and we have a government that seems to 
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say that ‘Well, laissez-faire is going to take care of this one.’ Well, that’s clearly not the case,” 
(Fekete, 2012). In addition, Peter Julian, the energy and natural resources critic for the Official 
Opposition believed that CNOOC was a strategic arm of the Chinese government, and that a host 
of issues ranging from the lack of environmental regulations, to transparency, and to CNOOC’s 
human rights violations plague the deal (Galloway & Tait, 2012).  
The NDP’s concerns were further amplified by that if the Liberals who believe that the 
takeover may surmount to waves of Chinese takeovers in the future. Liberal deputy leader Ralph 
Goodale said, “If Nexen is to be purchased, then what’s next? Is it Talisman, is it Cenovus, and 
is it Encana? Where do these dominoes begin to fall and where do they stop? They have been 
absolutely negligent in not engaging Canadians on this file and having the rules set by 
now…This decision will set the template for a lot more transactions” (Fekete, 2012). 
Nonetheless, Most Conservatives were very supportive of the deal. Industry Minister Christian 
Paradis fiercely attacked the NDP for arguing against the transaction:    
“The true motivations for the NDP’s actions are clear; frighten off investment and shut 
down trade. This is not surprising coming from the party that opposed free trade with the 
United States, our largest trading partner…The NDP’s actions are reckless and 
irresponsible. By attempting to politicize the review process they are creating the kind of 
uncertainty that scares off the investment Canadian companies rely on to create jobs, 
innovate and compete” (Galloway & Tait, 2012). 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper also criticized the NDP’s statements. He claimed that the 
NDP were following their socialist ideology, and that their opposition will have no effect on the 
transaction (Ibid).  In addition, Primer of Alberta, Alison Redford commented that in the past, 78% 
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of Alberta’s oil patch was owned by foreign investors; it was precisely because of foreign 
involvement that Alberta was able to become Canada’s economic engine. "It's not something that 
we are hesitant about," she said regarding FDI, “We think that if you want to play on the 
international stage and you have the sorts of resources that we have in Canada, it's important for 
us to be able to build those business partnerships” (Palmer & Ljunggren, 2012). 
    Despite the eventual success of the deal—under the barrage of criticisms from both the 
NDPs and the Liberals, the Conservative government, arguably made several compromises. 
Harper had indicated that the government will curb the trend of foreign SOE takeovers in order 
to make sure that the Canadian oil industry does not become controlled by foreign governments 
(Little, 2012).  From now on, only under “exceptional circumstances” would SOEs be allowed 
buy Canadian oil firms (Ibid). However, Harper’s did little to please the opposition. NDP leader 
Thomas Mulcair was dissatisfied with Harper’s new guidelines. He said that Harper changed the 
rules of reviewing foreign ownership without providing clear definitions of these rules, nor did 
he discuss them with Parliament (Ibbitson, 2012). Perhaps the real reason why Harper remained 
ambiguous on these guidelines was because he wanted to prepare Canada for future FDIs from 
Chinese SOEs. By using the word “exceptional”, his administration would retain a degree of 
control when wanting to approve certain investments from Chinese SOEs.  
But far more interestingly, the Conservative government chose to reject Malaysian SOE, 
Petronas’ $5.23 billion bid to purchase Progress Energy, which occurred roughly in the same 
time frame as the CNOOC-Nexen deal (Mayeda & Quinn, 2012). The deal was very similar to 
the CNOOC-Nexen deal in many respects. In both cases, foreign SOEs were bidding to takeover 
Canadian firms in the oil industry. Although the assumption is difficult to prove, the 
Conservative government may have rejected Petronas in order to guarantee an easier approval of 
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CNOOC’s much larger 15.1 billion acquisition. The logic is simple, considering the size of 
China’s economy, Canada can undoubtedly gain more benefits from future Chinese FDIs than 
from future Malaysian FDIs. In essence, rejecting Petronas silenced voices within the opposition 
whom may accuse the government of allowing “just any” foreign SOE to takeover Canadian oil 
companies without undergoing the proper ICA review procedures.  
 Would CNOOC be capable of manipulating Nexen’s oil supply to seriously damage 
Canadian economic interests? The answer is likely to be no. In 2012, Suncor produced an 
average of 499,276 barrels of oil equivalent per day (boe/d), and Canadian Natural Resources 
produced an average of 451, 378 boe/d ("The 100 largest," 2013). Nexen produced only an 
average of 163, 300 boe/d, approximately at only 30% of each previous firms’ boe/d capacity 
(Ibid). Furthermore, when observing Nexen’s average boe/d as a percentage of  the top 15 
Canadian gas and oil producers chosen by average boe/d, Nexen only has a mere 2% share 
amongst the top 15 (Ibid). If all gas and oil producers were included in the calculation, Nexen 
would have a less than 2% share of total average boe/d produced by all Canadian firms. Due to 
the abundance of suppliers, any attempts CNOOC makes to withhold Nexen’s supply of oil from 
Canadians would be easily mitigated by the supply of other oil producers. This evidence coupled 
with the logic demonstrated in the previous case that more effective means are necessary for 
China to transport oil produced in Canada, the deal clearly failed to meet Threat I requirements.  
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 Would CNOOC use the technology and expertise it gained to undermine Canadian 
economic interests? Borrowing the logic from previous cases exmined, if the CNOOC gains 
better drilling and extraction technology, the firm would most likely use such technology can 
their own extraction facilities. Doing so will most likely increase the global supply of oil, 
lowering both the price and supply of oil. In effect, this will give canadians an increased degree 
of access to oil. Although Nexen possess drilling and extraction facilities in non-oilsand regions, 
still the majority of Nexen’s assets are in Canada. Using the logic used to evaluate the Sinopec-
Syncrude deal, technolgies used to extract bitumen from oilsands in the short-term and possibily 
in the long-term would be quite useless in Chinese hands. The deal thus failed to meet Threat II 
requirements. 
 Is there a chance that CNOOC will sabatage Nexen’s products or use Nexen to spy on 
Canadians?  Again, one simply needs to observe the supply of oil to answer this question. Even 
if CNOOC manged to sabatage all of its petrolium products, Canadians have an abundence of 
other suppliers to purchase oil from. The damege CNOOC is capable of doing will be miniscule. 
In terms of survalience,  it would be difficult to use petrolium products as a means of spying on 
Canada. Before being allowed to purchase Nexen, CNOOC agreed to the terms set out by the 
government that at minimum, Canadians will hold 50% of  Nexen’s board and mangement 
positions (Argitis & Mayeda, 2012). With Canadians co-supervising Nexen’s operations, not 
only does this decrease the chance of the first two threats, chances of Threat III will be kept in 
check as well. The CNOOC-Nexen deal also failed to meet Threat III conditions.  
This case effectively demonstrated the theory. First, the Canadian lawmakers approved 
the deal through the ICA. Second, Group contestation mostly between party lines—though 
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ultimately ineffective at stopping the deal—forced the Conservatives to make some compromises. 
Third, the deal itself posed no real threats as demonstrated by the Three Threats Framework.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
 The conclusion here is obvious. In the US, when deals become politicized, the chances of 
rejection are high. While in Canada, that line of causality does not exist. Even in the Minmetals-
Noranda deal, the most controversial Canadian case examined, the ICA was never used to block 
the Chinese FDI. In other words, no direct regulatory blocks were ever used by Canada to block 
Chinese FDI. Conversely, in the US, even in the Huawei-3Com deal when Huawei was 
purchasing a minority share of 3Com, the deal was directly blocked by CFIUS. Furthermore, 
when Sany through its American subsidiary Ralls, wanted to construct previously non-existent 
wind-farms, the deal was also blocked. This comparison effectively demonstrates that different 
attitudes towards Chinese FDI exist between Canadians and Americans. In essence, Canadians 
are more likely to accept controversial cases than Americans. 
     In both Canadian and American cases, it was found that the decisions to block and 
approve FDIs were mostly influenced by cleavages—based upon group interests—found within 
Parliament and Congress. One can argue that in order to appeal to voters who have lost 
manufacturing jobs to China, Obama rejected Sany’s wind projects during the 2012 election 
campaign. Furthermore, the American cases have shown that representatives sitting on certain 
committees, or represent certain districts would voice opinions which appeals to their respective 
committees and districts. 
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 In Canada, it was shown that in most cases, Conservatives are usually supportive of FDIs 
which aligns well with their interest in promoting market-oriented policies, while the NDPs, with 
labour unions as their primary voter base, tend to be protectionist, and disapprove of Chinese 
FDIs. In sum, group interests manifested in policymakers are more influential on the review 
process in the US than in Canada. This was shown by how the Harper government was able to 
mitigate the interests of other parties to block Chinese FDI. Moreover, although difficult to say 
for certain, Canada appears to have more inter-party cleavages than intra-party cleavages than 
the US.  
 Finally in all the controversial cases examined in North America, little or no threat was 
found when the Three Threats Framework was applied in their individual evaluations. In all of 
the firms examined, an abundance of substitutes are available for the firms’ products. In other 
words, all firms examined do not meet Threat I requirements. As a concentration of supply is the 
most important of all considerations, failing to have a concentration of supply significantly 
diminished the potential threats for all firms. Taken everything into consideration, the cases 
examined align well with this paper’s theoretical framework.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION  
 In Chapter 2, through the collection and analysis of data, several important trends were 
discerned. Globally, Chinese FDI has been increasing rapidly since the mid-2000s. Most of 
Chinese investments are in the service industries but with more concentration in primary 
industries than rest of the globe. Looking at North America, although Chinese investments are 
still quite low, growth of Chinese FDI fits with the global trend of rapidly rising Chinese FDI. 
However, sectorial concentration of Chinese FDI differs in North America with more Chinese 
investments in the information technology sector in the US, and the energy and resource sector in 
both Canada and the US. Likewise, further differences exist between Canada and the US in 
sectorial distribution—with Canada having a concentration of Chinese FDI in a smaller number 
of sectors than in the US. Differences between Canada and the US in both distribution and 
concentration of Chinese FDI suggest that these two countries may have different approaches or 
perspectives in dealing with Chinese FDI. 
 Chapter 3 explored and compared the regulatory framework and process for evaluating 
FDI in Canada and the US. Through a brief glance at the history past evaluations, one can see 
that despite having very formal regulatory procedures for evaluating FDI, the informal 
politicization of deals has an effect on the outcome of the review process. In Canada, decisions 
made by the ICA appear to augment a sense of certainty to the Canadian regulatory environment. 
Perhaps the decision makers are not swayed by the opposition’s politicizations of certain 
transactions. As there has been no case of formal blocks of Chinese investments in Canada, one 
cannot argue with much certainty that Canadians are biased against Chinese investments. While 
in the US due to occasional interjections from Congress to block investments, the regulatory 
environment there appears less certain than Canada’s. Moreover, since the US had in the past, 
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blocked Chinese investments before and that there exists higher value/review ratio for Chinese 
FDIs, one can safely assume that the institution in the US may be biased against Chinese 
investments. 
 Chapter 4 provided a plausible theoretical framework and several examples to explain the 
difference between how Canada and the US treat Chinese FDIs, and why such differences exist. 
The chapter explains that when China grew both militarily and economically, it came to be 
perceived as a threat and a rival by the US, the world’s only hegemonic power. In the realm of 
international investments and trade, it is possible that China and America are competing with one 
another for hegemonic supremacy. However, in realm of FDIs, Chinese FDI poses little or no 
actual threat to the US. Nonetheless, due to the negative public perception of China in the US—
subjectively derived by the genuine threats of Sino-American competition in other areas, the US 
would be less likely to accept Chinese FDIs. The rationale being that the policy makers, while 
having their own individual opinions, often times make decisions in effort to adhere to group 
interests. Since Canada does not compete with China, Canadians are much more positive towards 
accepting Chinese FDIs.  
Chapter 5 reviewed several cases of controversial Chinese takeovers in both Canada and 
the US. In the US, when Chinese takeovers were politicized, they were blocked, while in Canada, 
even when deals were politicized there were no formal blocks issued. In the US, group interests 
channeled by law-makers and reviewers are strong in influencing the outcome of investments, 
while in Canada such influences were relatively weak. Finally, in both countries, when applying 
the Three Threats Framework on the cases, they were all found to have little or no threat. The 
results of the case study fit well with the theoretical framework introduced in chapter 4.     
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 Using the results found in this study, one can argue with much certainty that the US is 
more biased towards Chinese FDI than Canada. Of course, one must keep in mind that both 
Canada and the US both follow free-market principles when evaluating investments. The 
majority of Chinese FDI in both countries are not blocked, and are encouraged. Regrettably, this 
study was not able to include a case study of Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM. Lenovo, a Chinese 
computer manufacturer—despite much congressional opposition and controversy surrounding 
the deal—was successful in acquiring IBM. Nonetheless, the case studies in chapter 5 effectively 
contrasted the handling of FDI in Canada and the US. At least enough to demonstrate the US vis-
à-vis Canada is much more likely to reject Chinese FDIs than to approve them.  
 The blend of Realist, Constructivist, Pluralist, and RCI schools of thought in the 
theoretical framework offers a very unique way for explaining FDI and also a somewhat 
pessimistic view of Chinese FDI in the US. Although many may criticize this eclectic framework 
on grounds of naivety, the general reasoning of the framework, I hope, may be of use to someone 
conducting research on Chinese FDI or FDI in general.  
Generally, this theory demonstrates how FDI is treated in two-countries engaged in 
hegemonic competition—how FDI from the hegemonic challenger is more likely to be rejected 
by the hegemon than FDI from non-challenger states. In contrast, FDI from the hegemonic 
challenger will be comparatively espoused in a host-country not vying with the hegemonic 
challenger for supremacy. In addition through a detailed comparison of US and Canadian 
institutions, the theory has shown that it is possible for institutional constraints to mitigate the 
influence of group interests on the FDI evaluation process. 
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There is an interesting outcome if one thoroughly follows this framework’s reasoning. If 
China surpasses the US economically, as many scholars today predict, there is the possibility that 
American FDI in China may be politicized and scrutinized under the Chinese regulatory 
environment. Whereas, Chinese FDI in the US will be less politicized and undergo normalization, 
much like Japanese FDI in America today.  
 
6.1 Findings on FDI Determinants 
    
 First of all, in the US, when Chinese FDIs have been politicized, chances of CFIUS 
and/or Congress attempting to block the investment is higher. In Canada, the review system is 
capable of taking more pressure from the politicization of the deal, and less likely to block the 
Chinese FDI under review.  Second, group interests in all of the cases examined have played 
either a direct or indirect role in the evaluation process of Chinese FDI. In the US, group 
interests to reject Chinese FDI have been more successful than Canada’s. This outcome is due to 
a difference in perspective regarding Chinese FDI within the two countries and the effect of 
institutional constraints on the evaluation of Chinese FDI. Third, Chinese FDI usually does not 
possess any genuine threats. By using the “Three Threats Framework” to examine cases of 
Chinese FDI, it was found that all Chinese FDIs are in sectors in which their products only made 
up a small fraction of total supply. Lastly, despite the low level of threat associated with Chinese 
FDI, both the US and Canada at times misjudge the nature of Chinese FDI. In North America, 
but especially in the US, Chinese FDIs are often misinterpreted and misrepresented—often times 
leading to their unnecessary rejection.  
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6.2 Theoretical Contributions 
 
 The eclectic model based on the relationship of origin and host country competition 
offers a new approach to observe and analyse Chinese FDI, and FDI in general. This model 
intentionally avoided the use of traditional cultural and historical institutionalist approaches in 
order to explain and accommodate for the changing nature of FDI flows. If the world order were 
to shift in the future—dethroning the US and crowning China  as the globe’s economic 
hegemon—this model, hopefully, will still be able to explain the FDI flows accordingly to the 
change in world order. In addition, although FDI is a common subject, the inclusion of 
constructivism as an analytical approach is slightly uncommon. Although not based entirely on 
constructivism, this model validates the potential of social constructivism being a legitimate 
approach in explaining FDI trends.   
 Moreover, this model opens up new possibilities for future research. For example, would 
regional competition between a challenger state and a regional hegemon yield similar results? 
For example, one can use this model to assess Chinese FDI in Japan, or vice versa. Furthermore, 
one may perhaps use this model to compare Chinese FDI in Australia and the US, or in the 
United Kingdom and the US. Considering the growth of Chinese FDI in the future, there will 
undoubtedly be a plethora of ways this model can be applied.  
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